CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE PRICE OF DESTABILIZATION

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BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

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CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE PRICE OF DESTABILIZATION

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1987

House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Hunger,
Washington, DC.

The select committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mickey Leland (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Members present: Representatives Panetta, Dorgan, Carr, Penny, Flake, Bilbray, Emerson, Gilman, Smith, Bereuter, and Molinari.

Also present: Representative Wolpe.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICKEY LELAND, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Chairman Leland. Good morning. I would like to welcome you to today's hearing on the crisis in Southern Africa and the central role that South Africa's efforts at regional destabilization have played in creating this crisis.

This is our second hearing on emergencies in Africa this year, and our fifth since the select committee was created in 1984. I am deeply concerned that considerable efforts, which should be centered on promoting Africa's long-term development, are consumed, out of necessity, by the recurrent crises on the continent. Response to a famine, however well executed, does not address the underlying conditions of absolute poverty which leave millions of Africans vulnerable to repeated misery and suffering. It is the environment in which famine arises that we must ultimately alter if we are to avoid a repeat of these emergencies time after time.

What disturbs me most about the current emergencies in Southern Africa, however, is that they have not been principally the result of drought, poorly conceived government policies or failures in development. The primary cause of the enormous food deficits in Angola and Mozambique has been the actions of insurgency forces supported by the Republic of South Africa. These are man-made famines, if you will.

In Mozambique, the insurgents, known as RENAMO, have attacked major transportation links, schools, health clinics, rural villages, and have made agricultural production and distribution all but impossible. In Angola, UNITA has also attacked essential infrastructure and, by placing land mines in paths and fields, has brought agricultural production to a halt in many areas. The havoc that these South African-supported groups have wreaked on Mozambique and Angola plays directly into South Africa's hands. It has created continued dependence by the front-line states on South Africa and, by doing so, has minimized the external opposition to apartheid.

It has also created famine. This famine presents the U.S. Government with difficult questions. Shall we meet our humanitarian obligations to the starving people of Southern Africa despite the political complications? And if so, shall we debate how serious the food shortages are and who is to blame for them, or shall we provide necessary assistance now before thousands starve?

I believe that we must make it clear now that the U.S. Government will continue to respond quickly and with generosity to famine victims. The U.S. Government must carry on the policy that President Reagan established during the Ethiopia famine of 1984–85: That a hungry child knows no politics. The record must be clear that we all can see what is coming in Southern Africa. The record must be clear we must choose to act, and we must act now.

I want to thank our witnesses for being here. Now, let me yield to our ranking minority member, the vice Chair of this committee, Bill Emerson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL EMERSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Mr. Emerson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this opportunity to receive the testimony from our witnesses this morning on the current situation in Southern Africa. This is certainly an important and relevant subject for the consideration of this committee, although I am afraid that it is also a topic that may be easily distorted. It would be a grave injustice, in my view, to the people of Southern Africa if this committee examined only selected problems in the region and ignored other basic causes of hunger.

I am particularly concerned that in our rush to condemn the apartheid regime in South Africa we may be creating a misleading impression about the causes of hunger and suffering in Southern Africa. The people of Southern Africa will not be helped if we blame South Africa for all the problems in the region, while ignoring the policies and mistakes of other regimes that have brought such misery to their own people. The obvious injustices of the white-ruled South African government do not justify the oppression or the incompetence of some of the other regimes of Southern Africa.

A most significant example of selective criticism can be found in some statements regarding the civil war in Angola. A legitimate resistance organization, UNITA, is fighting against a Marxist faction that has been able to impose itself on the country only with the help of over 30,000 Cuban mercenary troops and several thousand Soviet Bloc advisers. Since coming to power in 1975, the MPLA regime has destroyed the economy and spent the vast majority of its budget on fighting other Angolans. I am concerned here that we are seeing a pattern emerging such as that which we saw in Ethiopia.

Civil war is certainly causing tremendous suffering. No doubt about it. But it should be noted at the beginning that UNITA has repeatedly called for a negotiated end to the war and the MPLA has refused. It should also be emphasized that there is sufficient food in the UNITA-controlled regions of Angola. Only the MPLA cannot feed its population, and I think there are two reasons for this disparity.

First, the MPLA instituted disastrous economic policies that destroyed the economy. The economy has been reduced to a state of barter. Farmers have no incentive to produce beyond their own needs. Consequently, there is no excess production for sale in the cities.

Second, the MPLA uses the considerable foreign exchange it earns from its sale of oil to feed its war machine instead of feeding its own population. Last year, the MPLA purchased about $1 billion in arms from the Soviet Bloc. This represents a significant increase from previous years. Had the MPLA used even a small part of that money to buy food for its own people, there would be no threat of starvation in Angola.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I urge our committee to refrain from using the lives of innocent people in Southern Africa to attack racism in South Africa. The struggle for freedom in Southern Africa is currently being waged against oppression by both whites and blacks, and we shouldn't let our shared opposition to apartheid prevent us from aiding the struggle against Marxist tyranny.

That concludes my opening statement.

Chairman LELAND. I thank the gentleman from Missouri.

Let me now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Carr. The gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Bilbray.

The gentlemen having no statements, we will now introduce our first panel of witnesses and we want to welcome all of you here. I would like to welcome Mr. Roy Stacy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Ms. Julia Taft, who is the Director of USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

Mr. Stacy, I understand you have a brief statement for the committee and then both you and Ms. Taft will answer any questions that we might have. So, if you will just proceed with your testimony, we would appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF ROY STACY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY JULIA TAFT, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND WILLIAM J. GARVELINK, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AFRICAN RELIEF, BUREAU FOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS

Mr. STACY. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. I would also like to introduce Mr. Bill Garvelink, from the Office of Refugee Affairs, who can also I think respond on some of the refugee matters. We want to make sure that we have the fullest range of information available to the committee.

Assistant Secretary Crocker regrets that he was not able to be here today. But with two of the front-line state presidents in town this week, Presidents Chissano and Kaunda, he is quite occupied with those visits as you can imagine.

Mr. Chairman, I want to try to summarize my remarks, which I have already submitted for the record. But I do want to focus a little bit principally on Angola and Mozambique. It is my understanding that those may be the principal areas of concern to the committee, but we recognize that there may be other areas of Southern Africa and emergency issues that you would like to explore.

Certainly the major food crisis in Southern Africa today is in Mozambique, and Mozambique is no stranger to food shortages having gone through the very substantial drought of 1981–85 and in the past from other natural disasters. However, let me make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that the primary cause of the disaster in Mozambique today is civil strife. Normal food production, distribution and marketing have been disrupted by attacks on farms, rail and road networks, as well as food relief convoys. Intense fighting between RENAMO and government forces in the central provinces has caused people to flee from their homes, abandoning farms and not planting crops. As a result, the government now estimates that some 3.2 million Mozambicans are considered at risk and another 3.3 million of the destitute rely on food assistance from the international donor community which they purchase through marketing channels.

Now, the U.S. response in the case of Mozambique I believe has been significant and timely. This country has played a leading role in assessing the extent of the crisis and in organizing and contributing to the international community's responses. In early January 1987, our Ambassador determined that a disaster situation existed and requested emergency food and disaster relief. In February, we called on the United Nations Secretary General to appoint a special coordinator for relief operations in Mozambique, which he did later that month. At the same time, A.I.D. dispatched an assessment team from Washington to review the status of relief efforts and lay the groundwork for our response to a U.N. appeal for emergency aid.

At a U.N.-sponsored pledging conference in Geneva, in March, the United States made the following commitments: 194,000 tons of food worth $68 million; $3.6 million to private voluntary agencies for transportation, distribution, and monitoring of relief efforts; and $3.4 million to UNICEF for medicines and transport. More recently, we have committed an additional $1.2 million to the ICRC to assist in its important work in delivering food to conflict areas of Mozambique. All told, U.S. humanitarian assistance in fiscal year 1987 to the Mozambican food crisis amounts to about $75 million, approximately one-third of the total international response, making the United States the largest single provider of food and emergency relief in that country.

There are, however, Mr. Chairman, some serious relief assistance issues, and I think first and foremost is the question of the accessibility of people at risk. The greatest single difficulty associated with the relief effort in Mozambique is getting food to people in areas where RENAMO is active. Particularly in the central provinces of Zambezia, Tete, Sofala, northern Niassa, RENAMO has impeded the movement of goods by hit-and-run attacks on food convoys and placement of land mines in roads. In this manner, the insurgents have restricted or interrupted access to large areas where, in fact, they have no control or administrative capacity.

To deal with this problem, the International Committee of the Red Cross, acting on behalf of the donor community, has been in contact with all parties to the conflict to arrange food deliveries in conflict areas, a task ICRC has performed with distinction in war-torn areas around the globe. The ICRC began delivering goods and medicine in conflict areas in central Mozambique in June and it expects to have deliveries of 1,500 tons of these vital supplies in 40 different sites in the conflict areas by the end of 1987. I think this prepositioning in those areas is quite a significant fact.

Now, we continue to believe that ICRC's efforts offer the best means of seeing that hungry people are fed in areas that are difficult to reach. In pursuit of this goal, we have had a series of consultations with ICRC and will work with them to strengthen their response capability. The ICRC is working to expand its operation, but it needs additional support from the government of Mozambique, including access to additional supplies of food and medicine, to do so.

A second area of major concern, Mr. Chairman, is the refugee question. During the past year several hundred thousand Mozambicans have fled across their country's borders to escape the fighting, nearly 300,000 to Malawi alone. Feeding and caring for these refugees have placed an enormous burden on the resources of Mozambique's neighbors.

You are aware, Mr. Chairman, we do not normally earmark refugee assistance funds for a single country or region, but rather contribute 30 percent of UNHCR's overall budget for African refugees. Since the Mozambican refugees in Malawi are newly arrived and the subject of a new emergency program, the United States has specifically provided 950,000 to UNHCR and 450,000 to the League of Red Cross Societies in Malawi. In addition, we are making available 18,000 tons of food for Mozambican refugees.

Briefly, Mr. Chairman, the current assessment in Mozambique and the international response to it. We have recently sent a disaster relief team, assessment team, to Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Malawi, in August and September, and they have arrived at a number of conclusions which I think it is important to share with the committee. First of all, there is a continuing and significant need for emergency food in Mozambique despite the already substantial international commitments and, in cooperation with the international community, Mozambique is really working to meet that need. Food is moving toward and getting to people who need it, and that is important.

That said, the system needs to be improved to better pinpoint the scope of emergency requirements and to ensure that food reaches all who are at risk. The first step in this direction should be better coordination among the donors, the United States, the United Nations, and between the donors and the government of Mozambique. The numbers of affected and at-risk persons need to be verified systematically. Spot checks have indicated that current estimates are soft and need rigorous review. The ICRC's program which addresses the area most affected by the insurgency needs to be expanded and strengthened. And while Mozambique has legitimate emergency problems, it also has problems resulting from a history of inappropriate economic policies, which it is working hard to correct. In particular, the government now needs to lift the fixed price controls on transportation rates, so that private transportation operators will be able to move supplies over a wider area. More generally, problems of this sort need to be addressed as part of the government of Mozambique's ongoing economic reform program in order that we can begin to move from an emergency phase to a rehabilitation phase, and I think that it is the desire of most donors.

We have discussed these issues with the government of Mozambique during the last few days during President Chissano's visit, and with the coordinated effort of all involved, I think that we can be on top of the management of the Mozambique food crisis in the near future.

Mr. Chairman, I know I am taking more time than you would normally allow witnesses, but I wonder if you would permit me to go on to a brief assessment of Angola.

Chairman LELAND. No, please proceed.

Mr. STACY. Now regarding this second food crisis of interest, and I think you will draw from my comments that we do see some distinct differences between Angola and Mozambique, the United States has consistently demonstrated its willingness to respond positively to the legitimate request for humanitarian assistance in that country. Since 1981 the United States has provided over 78,000 metric tons of food with a dollar value of more than $33 million to nongovernmental organizations operating in Angola. The bulk of this assistance has gone to UNICEF and the ICRC. We have already provided 12,000 metric tons of high protein food this year, in 1987, to UNICEF and we are reviewing a UNICEF request for an additional 22,000 metric tons.

Now, since the United Nations Emergency Operations Group report was issued in June 1987, the departments and the offices represented here have been engaged in a sustained effort to evaluate food availability and requirements in Angola. Other donors are also conducting their own assessments of the situation, and the World Food Program is preparing, as we understand, a proposal for another 22,000 tons of food aid into Angola.

Now, beyond our current efforts we are prepared to participate in a well-managed and responsible international food relief effort in Angola once the extent of the emergency needs are demonstrated and there is a more thorough assessment of logistical requirements to ensure effective distribution of relief commodities. But I wish to note, however, that there is a problem in establishing the extent of the urgent and extraordinary food needs with respect to Angola, which are referred to in your letter inviting our testimony.

Granted there are several reports projecting impending food shortages in Angola. The most comprehensive and notable of these reports was the Third Country Brief. There have been other reports issued by nongovernmental organizations since then, but they all draw on the basic data from the Third Country Brief, which reports that there are 690,000 displaced persons and 1 million urban destitute in Angola, requiring 242,000 metric tons of food and $115 million in other assistance.

Now, while these numbers are plausible, the Third Country Brief has not offered an explanation of how these figures were derived other than to note that much of the raw data for the assessment was obtained from the government of Angola. We have confirmed that the U.N. organizations represented in Angola have not been able to make fully independent assessments of the food crisis in the country.

Now there are serious analytical shortcomings in the U.N. report, especially with its primary premise that the country's worsening economic situation and the subsequent increased food aid requirement is attributable to declining foreign exchange revenues, and thus reduced commercial food import capability, all from a drop in oil prices. In fact, the price of oil has risen substantially since March of this year.

With current production of over 300,000 barrels per day and a price of almost $19 barrel, Angola will earn some $1.8 billion in oil revenues in 1987, an increase of $500 million over 1986 earnings. The rise in earnings has occurred at a time when international grain prices have been falling. We, therefore, estimate that $35 million would purchase the roughly 200,000 metric ton food shortfall calculated by the U.N. in its June 1987 report. Nonetheless, and paradoxically, while oil revenues and purchasing power are up, commercial food imports by Angola have been cut by about one-third from 1985 or to one-half of what they were doing earlier.

We, therefore, do not believe that all food shortages in Angola can be blamed on warfare and lost oil revenues. Whatever the primary causes and the final numbers of people in need, it is clear to us that the government of Angola has the wherewithal to assume greater responsibility for Angola's at-risk populations, especially the large numbers of urban destitute.

In sum, we lack objective, field-verified data, and this is a real concern. We are encouraged, however, that several recognized international relief agencies are prepared to carry out assessments of the situation, the Angola government permitting. So are other respected international relief bodies. One PVO, CARE Canada, has submitted a proposal to the government offering to perform a comprehensive independent assessment. The government of Angola has expressed interest in such an assessment but has not yet responded. Yet it is this kind of independent survey that is needed to establish both the extent of the crisis and how best to respond to it.

The ICRC is also considering a food needs assessment in Angola's Planalto region where it has had operations for 6 years. Now we would view positively any independent evaluation of the at-risk population in urban and rural areas that is not currently served by the NGO community, and we would be prepared to finance that assessment.

And, finally, I think a major obstacle in recognizing or attempting to ameliorate the food crisis in Angola is the absence of an official appeal by the Angolan government. We are waiting to see if they will make such an appeal, and if such a meeting is organized in Geneva, we would certainly plan to attend that.

Mr. Chairman, I want to re-emphasize my earlier comment that the U.S. Government will do all that is necessary to respond to legitimate food emergency needs in these two countries as well as other countries in the region. I thank you for your indulgence on my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stacy appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 54.]

Chairman LELAND. I thank you, Mr. Stacy. And let me also say that I commend you and your work. Despite the ideological differences and the political problems that the administration has with both the Angolans and the Mozambicans, the U.S. Government has done some good in both countries. Not all that I would like to see done, but certainly the United States has had some measure of success in both areas. I have some difficult political questions to ask, however.

First of all, let me ask you what kind of government is the government of Mozambique? Where is their ideological foundation? Is it not Marxist-Leninist?

Mr. STACY. Certainly the government of Mozambique since its inception, since independence has followed various Marxist-Leninist policies. Some of their early economic policies which resulted in the collectivization of agriculture, moving people into what were called aldeais communaias, which were really communal villages, in a coercive way, were reprehensible and were certainly very Marxist in orientation. Since 1983 we have seen a distinct shift in policies, particularly in the economic arena. Today, it is possible to have private land, to have permanent land titles so that it can be passed on to your family and to your sons. They have privatized food production in many areas, particularly in the vegetable farming areas. They are privatizing parastatals. I mean, if I look at Marxism-Leninism as an economic theory or an economic policy, I don't think Mozambique is Marxist-Leninist today in that regard.

Chairman LELAND. Well, I was at a luncheon yesterday where Mr. Chissano, the president of Mozambique, was asked what was the basis of his government, and he suggested that he was Marxist-Leninist. Chissano said that, however, had no bearing on the kind of relationship that he had hoped that the United States would maintain and expand with the government of Mozambique.

The reason I asked the question is because it has been indicated earlier by my colleague, Mr. Emerson, and by many others in this great debate on policy toward Angola that because the Angola government is Marxist, we should continue to support UNITA's efforts to overthrow the government. Could you tell me, then, what the difference is between Marxism in Angola and Marxism in Mozambique?

Mr. STACY. Mr. Chairman, I think I answered the question more as an economist, or certainly with an economist's spectacles on. I have been around Africa a long time and I have seen many governments of many stripes, and I have a little bit of problem with labels sometimes. I have served in a number of countries where, rhetorically, they were Marxist-Leninist because that enabled them to get certain kinds of supplies from the Eastern Bloc that they probably couldn't get from the West. On the other hand, when they went about their economic policies it was certainly something that was more akin to capitalism as I saw it. So I really wasn't sure how these labels might apply. And I look at Mozambique I think with the same set of spectacles.

Let me come back to your question of Angola and Mozambique and their differences. And I recognize that there are people who, perhaps, don't see any differences. Probably the rhetoric in many instances, if one is using labels, may not be greatly different. The question, though, is if you look at Mozambique and its historical relationship with the United States over certainly the last 10 years there has been an evolution of cooperation. I believe that Mr. Crocker has testified that practically no country in Southern Africa has been as cooperative with the United States as has Mozambique.

There have been very substantial economic reforms in that country. They have refused to allow the Soviet Union to have base rights in that country, and yet when you look at Angola you see a whole mercenary force encamped there.

Chairman LELAND. What do you mean by mercenary force?

Mr. STACY. A force that the Angolan government pays for out of hard foreign exchange which is diverted away from their development. When you have to pay for foreign troops, I think they are mercenaries.

Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, would you permit me just to interject a question here?

Chairman LELAND. Sure.

Mr. EMERSON. Does that mean 30,000 Cuban troops?

Mr. STACY. There are some estimates as high as 37,000.

Chairman LELAND. 37,500.

Mr. SMITH. Would the gentleman yield on that?

Chairman LELAND. I would be glad to yield.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Stacy, back to Mozambique. I don't know what has occurred since the death of Machel, but I do know that in the last 10 years Mozambique has voted with us in the United Nations less than the Soviet Union votes with us. If it is not a Marxist-Leninist government, I would like you to identify exactly what it is. And if there is a shade, what is the shade?

Mr. STACY. Let me respond, Congressman, to the voting issue. It is an issue that we have raised very strongly with the Mozambican government. As you undoubtedly know, there is quite an effort in the halls of the United Nations to have all of the African countries vote together. They have an OAU caucus. They get together and they say, "Let's stick together." As a result, some of the countries in Africa that are our closest friends don't vote with us more than 20 percent of the time.

Now, Mozambique cooperated with us on two very important votes in the United Nations—those on Cambodia and Afghanistan—resisting substantial pressure from the Soviet Union to vote otherwise. They have indicated to us that they are very aware of our concerns and that they are going to review their situation in the United Nations. I think we are getting cooperation on that front. And again, I would not like to measure their voting record as a measurement of Marxism-Leninism in that country.

Chairman LELAND. Mr. Stacy—if I may regain my time—let me just ask you, isn't it rather paradoxical, though, that we criticize the Angolan government for paying for troops to come and help them protect their borders when, in fact, we supply moneys and all kinds of support to those forces that they are trying to ward off to keep from destroying the integrity of their government?

Mr. STACY. I had assumed that question was going to come up today.

Chairman LELAND. You are a very wise man, Mr. Stacy.

Mr. DORGAN. Would the chairman rephrase that question? [Laughter.]

Chairman LELAND. Well, is it not rather hypocritical for us to criticize the Angolan government for their paying for troops to protect or secure their borders when in fact we, ourselves, fund UNITA and advocate the support of UNITA, which is bound and determined to overthrow the government of Angola? It is a rather self-fulfilling prophecy——

Mr. DORGAN. Would the gentleman yield?

Chairman LELAND. Yes.

Mr. DORGAN. Is that a case where at one point Marxist-Leninists were supporting refinery installations owned by U.S. corporations being attacked by a former Marxist that was armed by the United States?

Chairman LELAND. Exactly. Is that not the case, Mr. Stacy? We will direct the question to our witness.

Mr. STACY. I would like to come back, if I can, and answer this question by looking at what the topic of the hearing is, which is the food emergency in Angola, and I think which we are all very concerned about, Mr. Chairman. For quite a number of years, as you know, it was illegal for the United States to provide any assistance in Angola of a covert or intelligence nature and, as you are aware, I am unable to comment in open hearings on the nature of that assistance. But during that interim, during that 10-year period the government of Luanda amassed an enormous army, and continued to invite Cubans and other foreign troops in. Even in the last year, there has been over a billion dollars of purchases of Soviet arms. And the government has basically fueled this war to a level that I would say was really excessive, draining resources away from development on a massive scale. One side has fueled this war. It has not been the very, very modest assistance that UNITA receives from the United States.

It has been our position for some time to try to do everything to move parties to some sort of a negotiated end to this conflict, some sort of a reconciliation. I don't really think that the modest supplies that have been provided to UNITA can be——

Chairman LELAND. On the part of the United States?

Mr. STACY. On the part of the United States.

Chairman LELAND. You are not speaking about the amount of resources that are provided by the South Africans to the UNITA forces?

Mr. STACY. I have no knowledge of those resources.

Chairman LELAND. Now, Mr. Stacy.

Mr. STACY. I have no knowledge of the size or magnitude of that assistance.

Chairman LELAND. I take you for your word, Mr. Stacy, and maybe it is unfair for me to challenge you, but Mr. Crocker certainly knows of the resources and the support that is given by the South Africans to the UNITA forces.

Mr. **Stacy**. I think it is certainly common knowledge that the South Africans, even in the press reports and even in recent days, that the South Africans have come in to support the UNITA forces and have been a source of supply. I am talking about magnitude and size.

Chairman **Leland**. Well, Mr. Savimbi, himself, has admitted that he indeed has taken moneys and weapons and training from the South Africans, and used even South Africa as a base for training in some instances. While I understand that what we have done in comparison, to what South Africa has done might be considered to be rather small, don't you agree, though, that it is an understandable response on the part of the Angolans to increase their military spending?

Mr. **Stacy**. I guess, Mr. Chairman, we would probably disagree on that. I think that considering the magnitude of the military mobilization that the Angolan government has undertaken, sophisticated weapons certainly not even designed, or needed in a guerrilla war, and the current nature of the offensive southward, is only designed to provoke further introduction of foreign troops into Angola, which is what we want out of Angola. It is this militarization I think that has been more of a factor in creating the situation of hunger we are concerned about here today than it has been whatever U.S. assistance has gone to Savimbi. And that has only been of a very recent nature.

Chairman **Leland**. I have a lot more questions to ask, Mr. Stacy, and I don't want to encumber the time of our colleagues. I will yield in a minute to my ranking minority member. But, you know, this is a very difficult situation that we are faced with. I have been in Angola twice now this year and I am most concerned about what is happening to people who are not getting food, who are suffering from hunger and malnutrition. We have almost an impossible political situation because we continue to tell the Angolans that we want to develop a better relationship with them—Mr. Crocker has been over there several times trying to negotiate with them some kind of understanding between our government and theirs—yet at the same time we continue to fuel the fires by supporting UNITA. That is rather anomalous, to say the least.

How, indeed, are we going to get to the point of helping the poor suffering people there when, in fact, we are encouraging the situation, when we are fueling the situation ourselves? You know, if you go to Bie province you see people walking on crutches, one leg, one arm, half their bodies are blown off because of the methods that are being used by the UNITA forces—the forces that the U.S. Government supports.

The situation is horrendous, in my estimation. It seems to me that the United States ought to take a humanitarian perspective on this matter and disregard the politics, as was stated by President Reagan during the African famine crisis in particularly Ethiopia when he said, "A hungry child knows no politics." I am really concerned about the seemingly, contradictory state of our policy toward Angola.

Mr. **Stacy**. Mr. Chairman, I think the United States has responded in Angola. Our policy is that a hungry child knows no politics, and we have provided relief there. I can't say that the government of Angola has behaved as responsibly and as cooperatively in this regard frankly as it should. We know that there have been horrible civilian casualties in that war. And if the Human Rights report of the State Department is studied, you will see that we have indicated that this is probably caused by both sides. An indiscriminate laying of mines. We have made our views known on this, and no one would like to get this war stopped faster than we would.

But there are other external parties, and we know who they are. We were, frankly, very pleased by the resolution that was passed last night in the Senate, the Senate resolution urging that the question of Angola and the conflict there be brought up with the Soviets at the highest level. They are a party to what is happening there and they have to help.

Chairman **Leland**. But so are we.

Mr. **Stacy**. And so are we, yes.

Chairman **Leland**. Well, I am glad you are putting a pox on both our Houses.

Mr. **Stacy**. And we are the most active party trying to seek a negotiated solution there.

Mr. **Flake**. Would the chairman yield?

Chairman **Leland**. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman from New York, Mr. Flake.

Mr. **Flake**. Your statements indicate that we are trying to bring this issue to the discussion table with the Soviet Union. The question I have is, how can we possibly hope to gain solutions when in this particular instance we are in bed with China, North Korea, South Africa, and with the UNITA forces. How can we expect to be able to gain solutions with people who ordinarily we would have serious political and international problems with. We are jumping in bed with Savimbi, who deals with what we would consider to be Marxist or Communist governments, and we are the only, quote-unquote, "democracy" participating with them. I find it a little strange that while trying to move to some solution to the problem, we are, in fact, dealing with forces that we are usually opposed to. How will negotiating with the Soviet Union bring about the means by which we solve the problem between the government and UNITA?

Mr. **Stacy**. I think that if the Congressman has had a chance to look at the DeConcini resolution, the sense of the Senate resolution that was introduced last night, it indicates that—and this is actually something that has been a policy of the Administration for sometime—is not only to discuss global issues with the Soviet Union, but also to discuss regional issues, and Angola has been one of those. I think the indication is, essentially, we do seem to be making some progress on some of the global issues. By all means we should pursue with that superpower some of these regional issues because the situation in Angola is as urgent as the chairman suggests that it is, and we agree.

I don't think I would agree, sir, with your characterization of UNITA. And again, I am going to avoid labels. UNITA is a nationalist group of longstanding. Like many other nationalist groups in Africa, they have sought support from a variety of sources, and contradictory sources as you point out, China on one side and South Africa on the other. They are not an external creation as is

RENAMO. They have support in Africa. They have support in parts of Europe. It has a very strong tribal base among the Ovimbundu people. I would not characterize UNITA as you have done, sir.

Mr. **Flake**. Is it not a fact, though, that the support from all of those various countries has more to do with the individual style of Mr. Savimbi and his ability to get other governments to view them in a way that would suggest that they are, in fact, doing what they say they are when, in fact, it would appear that they are not? I think it is more the force of personality of Mr. Savimbi that has all of these various factions that ordinarily would be against each other working on supplying the same army than it is anything else. I think what Mr. Savimbi has done is covered all of his bases and made sure that if one faction moves he has another to fill its place. I think he has gone around the world and been able to successfully do that.

I am not so sure our role ought to be what it now is. I really have serious questions about that.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman **Leland**. Mr. Stacy, we will get back to you. Let me now give the time to our ranking minority member, Mr. Emerson. The gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. **Emerson**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think we need to reflect here a little bit on history and the Alvor Accords that were negotiated in 1975. When the Portuguese withdrew from Angola they recognized the MPLA and UNITA as legitimate representatives of the Angolan people. So, from the very inception, UNITA has been legitimate. And, as Mr. Stacy has indicated, other African and Mid-East nations, and we have reports that some NATO countries, are giving them support, so we are not alone. We are not alone in the West in giving aid to UNITA.

Mr. Stacy, I would like to ask you—in August, the Luanda regime issued an appeal for food assistance claiming that its population was facing starvation. The State Department questioned the need for the request, knowing that increasing oil revenues should be providing the MPLA with more than sufficient money for food. So why is there a shortage of food in the MPLA regions but not in the UNITA-controlled areas? And should the United States provide additional food assistance to the MPLA when it is spending a billion dollars a year on arms and not committing resources to its starving people?

Mr. **Stacy**. I am going to turn for a little help from my friends here on this question. I think I have already testified, Congressman, on what we estimate this year to be the increase in earnings in foreign exchange, and, frankly, we have the same question. It would certainly appear to us that they could buy substantial food. Frankly, we would be happy to sell them some. They do buy from the EEC. I think they could buy from us. I am sure that the farmers in Mr. Bereuter's district would very much appreciate that.

Mr. **Emerson**. Well, how about mine?

Mr. **Stacy**. And yours also, sir. [Laughter.]

Ms. **Taft**. I would like to just say a few words to set the record straight about the nature of our foreign disaster assistance and our humanitarian program. I think one of the most exciting things, in terms of our legislative mandates, is that we have a very apolitical humanitarian capability to respond through our title II program of Public Law 480 and through our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. We do not deal with politics. In spite of the overlay of politics and a very complicated situation—who is buying the oil, who is paying for what and who is not, who is not serving their people—our primary consideration in Angola is that we know there is massive need. The questions are specifically, where is that need, how do you reach those needy and what is the host government commitment and the environment in which you have to deliver that assistance? Many of you sat through all of the issues that we have had to deal with in other difficult situations where access was very difficult.

But, in Angola we have in place and have had in place two programs for the last 6 or 7 years. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Program, which covers 100,000 people in the Planalto area, which is the central plateau. They are serving 100,000 people with 50 expatriates, with six planes, with a food delivery, a medical and a rehabilitation and prosthetic program. We have supported this through the Refugee Bureau of the Department of State. We pay for 25 percent of the overall appeal for ICRC, and therefore we are participating heavily in that program. We also have provided ICRC direct food in the past.

We hear from ICRC that they think the program as it is currently structured for those people in the severely affected area in which they are working is not any worse, but not any better, so they plan to have a program next year at the same level. We will support them at the same level. We have asked them if they would be willing to expand and to do an additional assessment. They believe at this point their capacity is being well matched with the need and that there is no further requirement beyond what they are currently doing.

Our next program is with UNICEF. This year, as you heard in the testimony, we have provided 6,000 metric tons which have already gone in to the country in June. Another 6,000 metric tons is arriving this month. It is meeting some of the shortfall that we know exists, but this food is primarily programmed through UNICEF with the government of Angola. The problem is that UNICEF doesn't have a structure in the country to monitor the end-use. All the food is moved by convoys and there is no expatriate or real monitoring structure.

We have talked consistently with the other donors, asking what else is needed. How do we know which nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) are there? How do we know which ones have an agreement with the government to be able to go out and monitor the food and are very interested in working on this appeal, which is not yet a formal appeal? We have been talking consistently with the donors.

Now the next steps, as I understand it, will be that the U.N. is still awaiting a request from the government of Angola to go public with this appeal. Once that is public, the World Food Program and the UNDP will be hopefully going back in to do an assessment and updating of those June numbers, which are outdated. But what they didn't do last time, that all of the donors want this time, is an assessment of the logistical absorptive capability. There is no point in sending food when donors don't know to whom it is going or sending medicines that donors are not sure are getting to the right people.

We owe it to you who give us trust to be able to spend the money well and to know it is being spent well. But I want to assure you we are working on this consistently. We were encouraged actually when the government of Angola sent a team to Mozambique to review the relationship of the NGO's with the government of Mozambique. They were very pleased to see how the NGO's have been able to operate and the relationship with the government. The government of Mozambique has been terrific in working with the NGO's, and they have taken a very strong leadership role in being able to coordinate the humanitarian program.

We thought all of that would rub off on the government of Angola and they would come back and say, "Yes, we welcome NGO's. We welcome the kind of assessments that are needed and we welcome their participation." I think at this point we are all standing ready to see whether they will be more forthcoming in that score.

Mr. Emerson. The Luanda regime in Angola is currently making an offensive against UNITA. I wonder if you can comment on that, and also tell us, if the attack against UNITA fails, what effect do you think this is going to have on the prospects for a negotiated settlement in the civil war in Angola. And also, is there any prospect for a withdrawal of the Cuban troops?

Mr. Stacy. This is I am afraid, Congressman, getting off on the side of the house that I don't occupy. I am really the sort of development person in the African Bureau, but I will try to respond to your question.

We do have some information on the current offensive. We, frankly, wish it weren't occurring. But there has traditionally been a dry season offensive, and I, frankly, know about as much from the press as you do. That it appears that South African troops have entered the fray and that there has been a—this is what the press has been reporting—that there has been a fairly significant amount of fighting in the last few days.

Mr. Savimbi has been quoted as saying that he thinks that given the size of this offensive and the length of time that it took to mobilize it, that if this defensive is defeated that it will very much lead to a change in the prospects for some negotiation. It has been the U.S. view, though, that in the context of implementing U.N. Resolution 435 on Namibia that we could succeed in getting all of the foreign troops out of Angola, including the South Africans, and that continues to be our policy.

As you know, Mr. Crocker has had a series of three meetings with the Angolans in very recent weeks. There is a new proposal on the table. It is substantive. We still have quite a number of questions and things that need clarification. We would like to have a solid proposal on the Cuban troop withdrawal that might parallel 435 in some way and present this to the South Africans. The South Africans have said they are prepared to implement U.N. Resolution 435. We would like to hold them to that commitment. Beyond that I really don't know where the state of the talks are going. That is about as much as I know.

Mr. **Emerson**. Are you familiar with the UNITA offer to reopen the Benguela Railroad under international supervision?

Mr. **Stacy**. Yes, I have read about that.

Mr. **Emerson**. Well, has there been any progress on the suggestion, and could it lead to negotiations on a wider ceasefire?

Mr. **Stacy**. Well, this idea of reopening the Benguela, it is probably not commonly known but the Benguela Railway is one of the few privately owned railways that probably exist anywhere in the world, and there it sits in the middle of Angola. The company that owns the controlling shares of this company—I think it is called Tanganyika Concessions, Ltd. There is also substantial interest on the part of Lonro and the Societe Generale of Belgium. Those organizations have indicated that they were able to mobilize the considerable private financing to reopen the railway and they were the ones that were encouraging it.

I think the government of Angola at this point, though, has had some problems with their negotiations with this private group, so that in fact there has never been any kind of consensus in Luanda to respond to the offer that I think Mr. Savimbi has put on the table regarding the railway.

Mr. **Emerson**. Mr. Chairman, I think I have overused my time. I have more questions, but I think we should let our colleagues have an opportunity to question the witnesses.

Chairman **Leland**. The gentleman has been very generous and kind about his time. I appreciate that.

Let me acknowledge that we have been joined by the chairman of the African Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Wolpe. Howard, welcome.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. **Bereuter**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have three related questions. First of all, on Mozambique, and any of the three of you who would care to respond.

Recent reforms announced in Mozambique, what do you think the effect would be on the availability and distribution of food if implemented? How serious does the government seem about its declared move to begin an incentive-based economy? And what can A.I.D. specifically do to try to eliminate some of the counterproductive agricultural policies that, at least in part, cause Mozambique to be unable to feed its own population?

I think Mozambique and Ethiopia stand out as having had some of the most counterproductive agricultural policies in sub-Saharan Africa. What do these economic reforms mean? And what can A.I.D. do to try to encourage the elimination of some of these counterproductive agricultural policies?

Ms. **Taft**. Let me just say a few things about the nature of the program in Mozambique and the nature of the leverage that A.I.D. would have or could have. Basically, A.I.D. does not have a development program with the government. By congressional mandate, we are not involved in giving development and to the government, therefore our leverage and ability to exact certain kinds of reforms are quite limited. However, the reason Chissano is here this week with his economic ministers is to discuss their relationship with the IMF and the Bank and a variety of agricultural and other reforms that are taking place in Mozambique.

Mr. BEREUTER. I am aware of that, but I am asking prospectively. What can A.I.D. do to eliminate counterproductive agricultural policies in that country. We are trying to do some things elsewhere in Africa in eliminating those policies which encourage the piling up of people in urban centers and the retreat to subsistence agriculture in other parts of the continent.

Mr. STACY. Congressman, I think it is a very comprehensive and a very relevant question. Let me attack this from the standpoint of what is coming up in the way of rehabilitation. We really do need to move from an emergency situation in Mozambique, if we can, to rehabilitation, and one always comes back to the security problem, or the insecurity problem, which affects everything that you want to do. So far seed distribution, for instance, has been disrupted by the war, as has marketing. The government I think seriously wants to privatize a number of areas like agricultural input supply, seed production and distribution, agricultural marketing. It is difficult for any private entrepreneur to operate in many of these areas, so, as a result, you almost fall back to the fact that you have no alternative but to try to perform these functions through the public sector.

A.I.D. is restricted from working with the public sector given the current legislation. We can only work with the private sector. So you really get into a chicken and egg problem here. I think that if we had some changes in this public sector restriction that we could begin to work at privatizing a whole range of areas in the agricultural sector that could lead to a very substantial increase in production. Mozambique has the soil and the water resources. There is no reason why that country couldn't be a food-exporting country in a very short period of time, if we can get a combination of solving the security problem and continuing down this reform path.

Now I can only say what the IMF and the World Bank believe, and they believe that the government is extremely serious about this reform program and really intends to push it. The problem becomes, you know, you kick off an enormous number of urban problems when you move into these austerity measures. The rate of inflation is now on the increase in consumer prices in urban areas is astronomical, and many urban consumers can't afford them. So that while you get a few consumer goods on the shelves, which act as an incentive for people who want to produce, in fact, they don't have the wherewithal, at least in the near term, to buy the consumer goods.

So that we have to go I think at a certain pace on the reforms. We are, frankly, impressed with the seriousness of the government, but they are going to need help. They are going to need help all along the way.

Mr. BEREUTER. Shifting to Angola, just before Mr. Crocker's recent visit to Angola, the Angolan government expressed some interest in economic reforms and possible membership in the IMF and the World Bank. What is the driving force behind that interest, and what prospect do you see for a change from the Marxist orientation of the economic policies of Angola? What is behind this interest in the IMF? Are they serious about it?

Mr. STACY. I am not sure they are serious about it. I think that the driving issue behind their approach to the IMF at this point has been the very large debt that Angola now has, the international debt. They would like to go to the Paris Club and reschedule a lot of that debt, the Western debt. I don't think it is particularly attractive to see them asking for a rescheduling on all of their Western debt while they go ahead and honor their debt service payments to the Eastern Bloc for their armaments.

We would measure their seriousness in the IMF by the nature of their economic policies, and we have not seen in Angola at all the same degree of interest in doing something about exchange rates, doing something about private property and private farming. They are still following basically a kind of communal agricultural program in Angola. So we would measure their seriousness by the extent to which they could actually live up to the articles of agreement of the IMF regarding economic policies. We haven't seen that yet, frankly, Congressman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Finally, in either country, has A.I.D. considered the possibility of using generated local currencies or some other method of payment to keep the urban food crisis from rising too highly but at the same time permitting those prices for domestically produced agricultural commodities to go closer to a reasonable level, so that you do not have the incentive to return to subsistence farming?

Ms. TAFT. I will comment on that. There have been local currencies available for that kind of investment. As a matter of fact, I had a meeting with Minister Veloso just last week. We discussed at length opportunities for using that local currency to encourage just what you have talked about. In addition to that, he wants to encourage private truckers so that they can start getting more of the commodities from the rural area into the urban markets. So they are working on this. They are looking at a major problem, though. Many commodities are not available in the country and they still need hard currency to buy spare parts for their vehicles. Also they need to buy commodities and fabric to be able to make some of the consumable items for the commercial sector.

I think they are moving in that direction. From the emergency side, we are trying to shift more into the seed packs, the tools and fertilizer kits, the resettlement kits, for the people who can go and establish their own self-sufficiency. The World Vision Relief Organization (WVRO) is the agency with whom we are working on an ag-pack program. We expect to expand that again in this year. We know other donors are also interested in trying to shift away from the emergency feeding side to giving people the tools to help them establish themselves. We see that more as a trend and we will be doing that with the disaster relief program.

One of the problems, though, that has been created is that the mechanism for the emergency side is well staffed. They have got over 400 vehicles for the whole distribution chain, and yet there are not that many vehicles to be moving the commercial side of the food supply out to the district and provincial areas and to move the commodities back into the cities. I think one is going to have to look very closely at incentives to get the private truckers working and to try to move more of our efforts into recovery, as opposed to the emergency response. This is all under consideration and being addressed as we look at our requirements for this fiscal year.

Mr. **Bereuter**. Well, of course, we are immediately concerned about the emergency conditions and about the transportation of food, but the basic problem is the reduction in food in Africa, with less produced now than 10 years ago in almost every nation. And it is because, in my judgment, primarily—though certainly weather conditions have something to do with this—of counterproductive agricultural policies.

Ms. **Taft**. I don't think you can say that, at this point in Mozambique, that is the dominant factor. The dominant factor is basically there is so much civil strife and so much disruption of the countryside.

Mr. **Bereuter**. Correct the civil strife and you will still have a food deficiency in Mozambique, in my judgment. It won't be as severe.

Do you lack any authorization to begin to use generated domestic currency or other means to begin to correct this imbalance between low food prices and low production rewards? Do you lack any authorization? Do we have to change the foreign aid bill?

Mr. **Stacy**. Let me comment on that, Mr. Congressman. The question of authorization language deals with our capacity to work with and in and through the public sector. It is our desire to work to privatize as many of these areas of the agricultural sector as possible because we believe that is going to be the answer. But where you can't get normal seed production and marketing and so on, we have to fall back on the public sector. So the answer is yes, we do lack the authorization necessary to work in and with and through the public sector. On the other hand——

Mr. **Bereuter**. Only Mozambique, specifically?

Mr. **Stacy**. Yes. But I think a good measurement of this, sir, is that where you do not have a security issue, and I am talking about peri-urban agriculture, those people that are producing on private farms the vegetables and fruits and all the things that you find in the urban markets, those urban markets are now full, and they weren't a few years ago. They were empty. And that is almost a direct result of changes in agricultural policy, as far as I am concerned.

Mr. **Bereuter**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Leland**. Mr. Penny. Mr. Molinari.

Mr. **Molinari**. No, I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Leland**. Mr. Wolpe.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Stacy, it is good seeing you here today. And I want to express my appreciation to the chairman for extending the invitation to me to join with the select committee on this most important hearing. The conditions within Southern Africa are extraordinarily bleak. I am sure it has been well recounted. Angola and Mozambique currently have the highest mortality rates in the entire world, and there is a potential disaster still in the making both in Mozambique and in Angola. And I want to begin by expressing my appreciation for the administration's response in the case of Mozambique. I think that what is being done there makes all sorts of sense both from a humanitarian standpoint and from a political standpoint. I think the conversations that President Chissano had with the President this week were very useful.

President Chissano met with the Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday, and if I may just respond, maybe, to some of the thrust of Mr. Bereuter's questions. There was a good deal of discussion on the economic policy reform, and what has really been most dramatic about the Mozambican leadership has been its incredibly pragmatic approach to economic matters and its very acknowledgment of the failures of its earlier ideological approach to the Mozambican economy. Almost in a sense the self-criticism has been, perhaps, the most dramatic characteristic of the leadership. The administration I think has appropriately recognized that and it is I think very helpful in making it possible for the Mozambicans to forge a much more independent foreign policy course and to begin to address their economic problems. They need, of course, additional assistance in the security area as well, but I applaud the administration for that it has done in that area.

I remain very concerned about our Angola policy both from a humanitarian and a political standpoint. I find it, frankly, absolutely incongruous the suggestion that one of the reasons for going slow in terms of a humanitarian response in Angola is because there is some evidence that some Angolan revenues may be going toward the support of Cuban troops when America is pouring money into Angola in support of the military forces that are attacking the government. What else do we expect? I mean, if we are, in fact, supporting UNITA in its conflict with the Angolan government, then be critical of the government's efforts vis-a-vis UNITA, which we are helping to finance seems to me an absolutely ludicrous kind of proposition. But more to the point is the humanitarian cost of what is happening in that war. I mean, I wish there was some way of, in this country, understanding what the humanitarian cost has been. In Angola right now, it is estimated there are between 20,000 and 30,000 amputees, in that country alone, and most of those amputees according to all independent accounts, the amputations have occurred as a consequence of the laying of land mines in rural fields, primarily by UNITA forces. We are helping to finance that. And the displacement of population and now the additional hunger and the food problems the country is facing are all a direct consequence of the escalation of military conflict within Angola. Aside from all the political pieces, I mean, the notion the United States is somehow gaining in terms of our national interest by being perceived as supporting a South African-backed operation in Southern Africa; again, I think American interests are being terribly compromised by that kind of perception. I recognize that is not your bailiwick, but I think it is important to—if we are talking about the humanitarian issues, as I understand the administration's testimony here, it is to suggest that there is a much more cautious response to providing humanitarian needs for political reasons where we are helping to compromise the political situation itself. I mean, in terms of our own policy.

I would like to pursue for a moment this question of Angola's ability to pay for more product. I note that you estimate that Angola will derive some $1.8 billion in oil revenue for its national budget. How hard are those estimates? Are they based upon any direct conversations with American oil companies or other companies operating within Angola? Is there a range of figures? And if so, is that the high range, the middle range, the low range of estimate?

Mr. STACY. Those figures are very hard. As a matter of fact the 300,000 barrels a day may even be slightly low. The government has actually made quite a deliberate attempt over the last year to increase its daily production rate, so the figure of 300,000 barrels a day is very hard, sir.

Mr. WOLPE. How about the oil price? The barrels-a-day production figure, but how about the price?

Mr. STACY. Well, in the testimony here, I was using a figure of $19 a barrel. I am not sure where we are today. It has been sort of in that range. But there is another statistic which I think is important, Congressman, and that is, at the time when their revenue has clearly gone up, and we think substantially, by a half billion dollars, one could quibble about price and so on, in fact, they have cut their commercial food imports back by half, and that is what is inexplicable. And at the time their major destitute, according to the U.N. report, are in urban areas, people that this government should be taking greater responsibility for. These are not people that are in areas of conflict. These are urban destitute people, as far as we are concerned, that are starving because of a lot of policies that have undermined the agricultural economy. They could take a greater responsibility for those people.

And I don't think the United States has gone slow, Congressman, in our response. I would like to turn to Ms. Taft on that, if I could.

Ms. TAFT. Yes. I appreciate that. Look at what the United States has been doing there for the past 6 years and the way that, in spite of all the political overview, we have stayed with UNICEF, we have stayed with ICRC, we have been a major donor in the food area. Food is getting there this month that we are providing. We are trying to get a quantifiable appeal. We do not have an appeal. There is no international appeal. There is no appeal that the U.N. is backing at this point. They have done a report. They don't feel at this point it is in the shape that they can go to the major donors.

I don't think you have to wait for major donors before you do things, but we are doing things. We are trying to encourage the independent assessments. We are pressing the U.N. and other donors to indicate to us what they know; what NGO's have what access out there. What are the needs? We have gone to ICRC. We have said, "Can you do more? We are ready to back you." I think we have been very proactive on this within the constraints that we don't know enough because there is not enough NGO involvement, and U.N. involvement down there is unable to extend outside the Luanda area.

Chairman LELAND. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. WOLPE. Surely.

Chairman LELAND. Ms. Taft, you might have put your finger on something. We have a problem with identifying NGO's. We have a problem with assessing the situation, yet we don't go to the government and deal with them. Is that not correct?

Ms. TAFT. Well, we have gone to all of the agencies that have an Angola program and the donors that are involved.

Chairman LELAND. But not to the government?

Ms. TAFT. You mean whether we have offered ourselves to do an assessment?

Chairman LELAND. Have you talked to the government about what it is that you can do in Angola to help?

Ms. TAFT. Mr. Crocker may have. Roy, perhaps you can answer that.

Mr. STACY. During the visits of Mr. Crocker one of his staff aides did try to assess the food situation out there in the context of the talks that were being held with the government. As you are aware, we do not have diplomatic relations with the government, but that hasn't prevented us from going out to Luanda and talking about other factors. We are quite confident, though. I mean, all of the information that is in the Third Country report by the United Nations comes from the government sources. This is what the government says they need.

Chairman LELAND. We understand that. Now let me first point out that you continue to refer to the government as "the government." You know, we have got this anomalous situation where we don't recognize the government but we say that there is a government there. We support the antagonist and yet we still recognize the government.

In Ethiopia, in 1983, when Mr. Wolpe led a delegation to Ethiopia, we saw a preview of what was about to happen there. We went to the administration and said, "Please help." Mr. Wolpe and I, along with others, managed to have some moneys appropriated for that purpose. It took us 6 months to get those moneys used in Ethiopia. But the problem was that we didn't want to recognize the government of Ethiopia. We didn't want to work with the government of Ethiopia.

When we finally recognized that we needed to deal with the government of Ethiopia, finally we started feeding hungry people in 1984, after the BBC gave NBC the report and the American sentiment was in favor of helping Ethiopia.

Do we have to do the same thing there? Why doesn't Mr. Crocker go and sit down with Mr. dos Santos, or Mr. Shultz go and sit down with Mr. dos Santos, and say, "What is it that we can do to help feed hungry people and stop this incredible starvation and malnutrition that is forcing Angola to be the country with the highest infant mortality rate in the world?"

Mr. STACY. Well, I think the first question that ought to be placed would be, "Why don't you take a greater responsibility, you know, for feeding your people in terms of the urban destitute? Why don't you respond?" I mean, they have cut their commercial imports——

Chairman LELAND. Mr. Stacy, just a minute. Before we challenge them, why don't we challenge ourselves and our commitment to helping hungry people? You know, Mr. McPherson, during that whole fray with the Ethiopians, in 1983, kept saying on television, when I would sit there with him that the Ethiopians spent this number of millions of dollars on parades and this flamboyant display of power while there were hungry people starving in Ethiopia.

Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. WOLPE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. **Emerson**. I don't think the government of Ethiopia wanted to work with us, quite frankly. They didn't acknowledge their problem at first. They didn't want to acknowledge that. They were busy. It is a fact that they were busy celebrating the 10th anniversary of the Marxist revolution. They spent 10 percent of their gross national product in the year that we were there celebrating that, including building a statute of Lenin in Addis Ababa. Now that is an inescapable fact. They did that. And I don't disagree with what you say about feeding hungry people, but they weren't acknowledging the problem themselves.

Chairman **Leland**. If the gentleman would further yield, though. Let me say that is the very point that I am making. In spite of what the Ethiopian government did, we went in there and fed hungry people, and finally we did get the cooperation of the RRC—the government-sanctioned Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. The point I am making here is that in Angola we ought to do the same thing. That we ought to stop harping on the problems in Angola and start doing what needs to be done to help feed hungry people.

Mr. **Smith**. Mr. Chairman, will you yield on that? Will you yield, Mr. Wolpe, on this whole issue?

Mr. **Wolpe**. I would love to just finish my question, but let me yield further.

Mr. **Smith**. Thank you. Well, while you are answering all that——[Laughter.]

I want to ask you, in the whole effort in Ethiopia how many Ethiopian soldiers did we feed, and how much did the U.S.S.R. gain in monetary returns from our support to the Ethiopian people who were starving?

Ms. **Taft**. The only statistic I have, which is absolutely verifiable, is that less than 1 percent of all the U.S.-donated food might have been diverted or lost from any cause. That is less than 1 percent of over 700,000 metric tons in 1985 and 1986.

Chairman **Leland**. 700,000 metric tons?

Ms. **Taft**. Yes 700,000 metric tons. That is incredible. And we did that because we worked through the NGO's, through the American PVO's, who had their own logistical capability. They had their staffs. They had the monitoring capability, and we trusted them. We didn't give our food through the government.

All I am saying is that in Angola we have had very good experience working with the American private voluntary agencies and other international voluntary agencies. If they can get in and they can have a program, we can support it. The issue is how do you have a receptive environment where the government will allow them in? I was pleased on September the 18th that the government of Angola did present the U.N. June report to several donors who were at a meeting. Obviously, we were not there. We don't have diplomatic relations. There were members or delegates from other countries there who said to the government: "You've got to make this a public request. Go to the U.N." They have not yet done that.

Now this doesn't mean we are not working on it. The question that we have to address is how much do we push ourselves, or how much do we push through the ultimate distributing agencies, which should be the U.N. or the PVO's. If they can't get the access and they can't get the structure, we are limited.

Mr. **Wolpe**. I would like to reclaim my time to make a brief observation and one last question related to this issue of assessment of need inside Angola. The observation is that contrary to some of the suggestions that have been made here and, perhaps, the impression it was actually the Ethiopian government that made the first appeal. They went to the United Nations with an international appeal long before there was any televised attention to the dimensions of the problem inside Ethiopia. I know that because when I went out to Ethiopia, which was after the Ethiopian government had made its own appeal, after there had been I think a United Nations international request, we made our own first investigation of the situation in the field, and when we returned we couldn't get any public attention or interest. It was only subsequently with the BBC filming that we were able to finally begin to generate a response.

So let us be clear about one thing, and that is, it was the failure not only of the United States but of the entire international community to respond in a timely way in response to an appeal that had been made that led to the belated response, and which literally hundreds of thousands of people died.

Now my concern is strictly the humanitarian one. I have no quarrel with the suggestion that has been made. I mean, it is blatantly evident that the Ethiopian government and the Angolan government by their own economic policies have contributed to the problems that are being faced with respect to food shortages and starvation. It is no question whatsoever. And anything we can do to encourage the Angolan government now, and the Ethiopian government that is again facing another prolongation of the drought and another crisis in Ethiopia, to make the changes in economic policy that are required we ought to be doing.

The one thing I don't want to see happen again in Southern Africa is what happened in Ethiopia, where we kept saying that we were really interested in policy changes, we wanted to everything. The fact of the matter is we were very, very late and there was an enormous cost in terms of lost of human life. And if there is anything that has characterized the American approach to hunger policy over these years, it has been a bipartisan recognition that we are not going to allow political considerations to get in the way of saving the lives of children. And I want to make sure that we—I respect what is being said here about our willingness to move in as quickly as possible, but all of us, given the Ethiopian history, are perhaps very sensitive, and I don't want to see some of the political considerations get in the way of our response to what may be a very serious new situation in Angola.

Now, in that respect, let me ask my question as it relates to assessment of need. I gather that the thrust of Mr. Stacy's testimony has been that you have got questions about the Government assessment of needs and you are looking for more independent studies to be undertaken by PVO's or international agencies in which you would have greater confidence. I would like to have some clear understanding of what it is about the Government methodology that is suspect, and precisely what are you looking for in the way of independent assessments that would then give you the confidence so that you could move forward in a different way?

Ms. TAFT. I would like to respond to that. I don't think we would want to waste time on a lot of assessments of how many more people are hungry in Angola. I think there are lots of assessments out there and perceptions. The problem is we don't know what those statistics are based on, the statistics from the UNICEF report or the joint committee report or the June report. There is no understanding, there is no definition of how they arrived at any of those numbers except——

Mr. WOLPE. Have you called UNICEF and said, "How did you do it?"

Ms. TAFT. Yes, and they got them from the government. I think what we are trying to—what I think we need to do is to say, all right, whether you just cut those figures in half, there is still a great need. But the real assessment that I feel we need is where is the transport to get the food from which ports there? Who is going to be able to monitor that? How many trucks do you have in the country? Is there fuel in the country? Who is running those trucks? Who is able to schedule those trucks? How many innoculations are necessary? Who is going to deliver them? Is there the medical trained personnel country? Do you need "expats" to do it? What "expats" are acceptable? What agencies will you allow to go in? That is the assessment I am looking for. I don't have it, but I am pressing. The U.N. is going to be pressing a request to get knowledgeable people in to Angola there who will look at those sectors and determine what is needed from external donors. If you don't have that, then you dump it all in and everybody gets very upset.

Mr. WOLPE. Have those specific questions been put directly to Angolan officials?

Ms. TAFT. They have been mentioned by the U.N. representative as being necessary.

Mr. WOLPE. No, no, no. By us, the United States?

Ms. TAFT. No, not by me.

Mr. STACY. Again, no.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, then please, people, don't pretend we are doing everything that is possible. You are saying that you haven't even asked the questions of the government officials.

Mr. STACY. May I respond? The offers by independent agencies, including CARE, to carry out these very inquiries have not been responded to by the Angola government. We are not particularly equipped, frankly, as well as agencies that are currently on the ground in Angola to undertake these kinds of assessments. It has been our observation that the government has not utilized its transportation facilities primarily for food distribution. In fact, probably more for the prosecution of the war.

Mr. WOLPE. Well. I mean, it is up to you whether you do anything. That is all I can say. And the question is whether you have.

Mr. STACY. No. It is up to the Angola government to respond. We have indicated we would be prepared to finance this independent assessment. What I am saying is, I don't think the absence of diplomatic relations between our governments is impeding our assessment and our responding.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Look. Obviously the Angolan government has the principal responsibility here of trying to keep people alive. There is no question about that. I am just a little bit uncomfortable to hear that we are not raising these questions directly with the Angolans. We are critical of the international agencies in terms of their data collection. The United Nations' Director of Emergency, as I understand, says that the U.N. report was based on WFP, UNDP, UNICEF field workers' reports, not just government documents.

But, in any event, you are critical of those international agencies, and yet you are also testifying that you have not raised these questions directly with the Angolans. I find that a little bit odd.

Ms. **Taft**. I would not like to have my discussion characterized as criticizing those agencies. I think all the agencies are doing the best that they can within the constrained environments. I don't see, however, that this is just a bilateral issue between us and the Angolans.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Did I say that?

Ms. **Taft**. But you are implying that we will be able to have more leverage than the U.N. and the collective donors.

Mr. **Wolpe**. I am not saying that at all, and I don't like straw men to be erected here. Let us be very clear. The Angolan government has the lead responsibility here to care for its own population. There is no question, moreover, that their policies have contributed to the problems and that the civil war in that country is another major factor and that we are helping to finance the continuation and extension of the war. All of that is the backdrop.

Now, my only question is—you are the folks that are supposed to be concerned with our food policies worldwide. That is your government responsibility. Maybe I am distorting your testimony——

Ms. **Taft**. No, you are not distorting it.

Mr. **Wolpe** [continuing]. But what I heard you say a moment ago——

Ms. **Taft**. As a matter of fact, I think we are being very proactive.

Mr. **Wolpe** [continuing]. Let me just finish the sentence. Well, what I just heard you say is—if this is proactive, then I don't know what reactive is. Because what I heard you say is, first, you have questions about the validity of the international office estimates. Those questions may be valid. I have no way of assessing that. That is what your testimony is. Then in response to a question you said you have not raised these questions directly with the Angolans. I will just let that stand.

Mr. **Emerson**. Would the gentleman yield? You know, you don't like UNITA and I don't like the MPLA, and that is probably irrelevant to the point we are discussing here.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Yes.

Mr. **Emerson**. But a critical factor here is that, for success in a guerrilla war, there has got to be tacit support of the population. Insurgents are severely disadvantaged if the population is alienated from them. Now hunger in Angola is blamed on the civil war and UNITA attacks on the farmers, but most of the hungry people are in the cities under the control of the MPLA. Now why is it that the hungry people in Angola are in MPLA-occupied territory and the hungry people are not in UNITA-occupied territory? Maybe there is something good to be said for UNITA.

Mr. **Wolpe**. If I could just reclaim my time, and this is my last observation. The issue clearly—if the suggestion is being made here that only hungry people are in cities, I don't think that is Mr. Stacy's point. I think the point is that there are hungry people scattered throughout Angola. There is a major food problem, and the issue is not whether one is a UNITA or MPLA government. The issue is how do we get food to people who are starving. I think it might be helpful if we would have a direct discussion with the government involved. That is all I am saying.

Mr. **Stacy**. Congressman, I will raise your concerns. The point is taken and I will raise your concerns with my superiors. But I think that, you know, it really does have to reflect on a couple of facts.

First of all, we have information to indicate that the ICRC, in some parts of the country has cut back its program because they have had success in the sense that there are some areas of rural Angola that are doing well—they cut back some 50 percent since 1984 in the Planalto region. In addition, the EEC has announced a 30,000-ton program yesterday, with food to immediately, plus another 26,000 that was already in the pipeline. I have always testified to the response that we have made.

There is food that is moving out there, but, as Ms. Taft indicated, there are still very substantial questions regarding the internal distribution. We, frankly, feel that the best way to get at those questions is through an independent assessment through some of the international agencies or the PVO's on the ground, rather than our taking this on directly as a government, and we continue to believe that. But I will raise your concerns.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Thank you very much.

Chairman **Leland**. Mr. Panetta.

Mr. **Panetta**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have read your testimony and some of the comments to the questions. I guess what I would like to hear from you is a definitive statement about what the hell our policy is regarding dealing with the people in both Angola and Mozambique. If you could just give me a statement on what U.S. policy is with regards to the people who are hungry in both of those countries, I would appreciate hearing that.

Mr. **Stacy**. U.S. policy with regard to hungry people in those countries, Congressman, is to get food to them, and to work within the international community and through the international community to do the best job we possibly can to see that at-risk people are reached. We do ultimately get involved in political and security issues, which are factors that sometimes inhibit that response. But I think the policy is quite clear. The people in Ms. Taft's office and the Refugee Office, these people are working nonstop practically on these issues. That really is the policy on the food side.

Clearly, our policies on the political front for these two countries have been different, and many of the differences have already been highlighted today in this hearing. I would be happy to provide you with statements that have been made previously by Assistant Secretary Crocker on those.

Mr. Panetta. Well, I guess my question is have you been provided any guidance from the State Department that says that nothing that you do ought to in any way assist or deal with the political situation? In other words, I guess what I am looking for is has the State Department given you some guidelines in terms of when the food supply to a hungry people ought not to proceed based on the political implications that are going on in each of those countries?

Ms. Taft. Absolutely not. No, sir.

Mr. Panetta. Not at all?

Ms. Taft. No, not all.

Mr. Panetta. You feel free to provide as much food as necessary based on whatever assessments you——

Ms. Taft. Well, obviously, one has to get the food levels approved through the proper channels that involve several other agencies. But that has not been the constraint. The constraint is trying to recognize the fact we all have limited resources in our budgets and to make sure that what we spend is spent on programs that are well delivered and monitored. We owe it to you, on the food side, and for the nonfood side that my office is responsible for—medicines and blankets and other life-saving assistance—that it is not done with any political judgment. The only judgment that has to be made is, is there the ability to absorb, distribute, and monitor the assistance? That is the guiding principle. We cannot throw resources at a problem that has not been defined or before a system is in place to get the commodities delivered. Those are the only constraints here. There is not a political constraint.

Mr. Panetta. I think that it is important for the record that that be stated. Obviously, because of the political implications, there is a lot of suspicion here on all sides as to what is happening regarding food going to people. But I guess what I want to get on the record is the fact that what you are telling me is that no one in the State Department has said to you, "Don't proceed with this effort based on the politics of assisting one side or the other," with regards to these countries. Is that what you are telling me?

Ms. Taft. Yes, sir.

Mr. Smith. Will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. Panetta. I would be pleased to yield.

Mr. Smith. Thank you.

Then, I understand that we are not supplying any assistance to Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is Chinese Marxist leaning. Why aren't we? There are starving people in Zimbabwe.

Mr. Stacy. Congressman, I have just finished 5 years in Zimbabwe.

Mr. Smith. I understand that.

Mr. Stacy. I would have to correct the record. Zimbabwe has been a food surplus country for some time. It has been exporting food all over the region. This year they have certainly had a drought and their yield is not as high as it was, but they still have adequate supplies. In fact, they are even a milk surplus country.

There certainly are hungry Zimbabweans, I can attest to that. But the government has been I think very generous in the way it has distributed food. Zimbabwe has donated 50,000 tons of food to Mozambique, so they have actually become a food donor in their own region.

Mr. Smith. Well, Mr. Stacy, prior to 1985 we sent Zimbabwe $30–$50 million a year. We cut them off in 1985. Why?

Mr. Stacy. Well, I think the issue surrounding our political problems in Zimbabwe are well-known, which were highlighted by the walk-out of former President Carter. That assistance that was being provided at that time was almost all being channeled into the Zimbabwe private sector in a program that financed American exports into the country. Whatever food aid we provided to Zimbabwe was wheat, which was done on an exchange program. We provided them wheat, which they needed, and, in turn, they sent their surplus corn to other countries that were in need.

Mr. Smith. Now, Mr. Stacy, we sent them tractors, we sent them machinery, we sent them seed.

Mr. Stacy. That is correct.

Mr. Smith. We are no longer sending them anything in that respect.

Mr. Stacy. Correct.

Mr. Smith. OK.

Ms. Taft. May I just add that, from a humanitarian standpoint, we do have a major contribution toward the UNHCR program which is serving about 78,000 refugees there. An assessment team with Mr. Garvelink and Mr. Knight, from my office, went to Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique recently to review the whole regional situation and what the needs were. They came back with suggestions about how we might provide some more support for UNICEF in Zimbabwe, and we have asked UNICEF to submit to us a concept paper. UNDP also has some ideas about trying to alleviate some of the emergency strain on Zimbabwe.

I would like to say, though, that our group was the first group of Americans to get into the refugee camps in Zimbabwe in the last 3 years. Our group was very impressed with the quality of management of the camp—the fact that they were building their own houses, they had their own pit latrines, they were well nourished; although poorly clothed, basically their life-sustaining requirements were being met in a fairly organized fashion. Yet that doesn't mean that there are not affected populations near the refugee camps that need assistance. Thus, Zimbabwe is one of the countries we are concerned with from an emergency standpoint.

Mr. Panetta. Well, is it fair to say, Ms. Taft—I guess what I am looking for again is the general policy directions that you have. Are you basically saying that the directions are to provide help to the hungry regardless of the political situation in those countries?

Ms. Taft. It is not written down in such fine form, but let me go through what our considerations are. Our No. 1 consideration is that there has to be a bona fide, definable need and we have to know where the people are. Second, we feel that there has to be an evaluation of whether or not the country can make a contribution or is making a contribution toward helping its own people. We do this in volcanic disasters as well as famine disasters. This is just a basic assessment of whether the country needs external help and what is the best way to do that. We have to also consider what other donors are doing. We have a strong network with other donors. We are talking with them all the time about trying to cofund projects and do complementary projects in various countries around the world.

So our considerations are: Is there a need? Do we know how to define it? Is there a delivery mechanism for that need? Is there a willingness on the part of the country to accept external help, and also take care of their own? That pretty much circumscribes our response. It is not a political question of do we have diplomatic relations or don't we have diplomatic relations. You can look at the kind of responses we have done in the past year and find some very interesting countries in there.

Mr. PANETTA. So there is no fourth point that says, what are the political implications of providing help to needy people in that country?

Ms. TAFT. Well, I don't think we want to be so naive to not realize that, and we don't want to——

Mr. PANETTA. Well, that is what I am trying to get at, I guess.

Ms. TAFT. Let me just say that I have not ever been told I could not provide aid when there was a bona fide need to provide the assistance. That I can tell you.

Mr. PANETTA. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LELAND. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I regret I was delayed in getting here. I have another hearing going on at the same time.

Can I ask the panel what we should be doing that we are not doing in that area of the world to try to get more foodstuffs to the people who are most in need?

Mr. STACY. Congressman, I think we have testified today that I think we are, you know, at least in terms of the food response, I think that we are ahead of the curve right now. We have to stay on top of it. We have to get more information. I have identified in my testimony some areas in Mozambique where the response can be strengthened. We think the ICRC program should be strengthened. We think the government could do some things there to facilitate some private distribution of food, and we have taken these up with the Mozambique government this week.

There is food moving into Angola, but the situation there does require their answering of some questions. If the government comes out with an international appeal, we will certainly participate in that and in the meetings to get the assessment. I indicated earlier to Congressman Bereuter, who was here, we think that as we move from the emergency phase in Mozambique to what I would call rehabilitation we need to get out of this emergency mentality. People need seeds and fertilizers and food packs, and so on, to produce food. As we would get into, what we would call rehabilitation, it is necessary for us to work with the Mozambican public sector and there are currently restrictions on our bilateral aid program—that were put in by the Senate, not by the House—that indicate that we have to work exclusively with and through and in the private sector. I think that is an inhibiting factor. We would certainly like to see that authorization changed. And, if the current mark-up of the Foreign Assistance Act as provided by the Obey subcommittee goes through, we would have that flexibility, and we hope that language comes out in law.

Mr. GILMAN. Would any of the other panelists like to comment?

Ms. Taft. I concur with what he says.

Mr. Gilman. There was some question about a report that we received that UNITA forces were planting mines in Angola, and our State Department says that the mines are being planted by both sides indiscriminately. However, some of the information reaches us that some of these are being planted purposely by the UNITA in the paths of peasant farmers. Do you have any information with regard to that?

Mr. Stacy. Congressman, I must say that there certainly is a disturbing degree of civilian casualties in the whole region. We have tried to assess to the best of our possibilities, and this is reflected in the State Department's human rights reports. Our indication is, frankly, that UNITA has certainly been more careful, more conscious of avoiding civilian targets than has been RENAMO, if one wanted to draw a comparison in Mozambique, where that organization has been quite brutal and has certainly hit civilian targets almost deliberately according to the information I have.

We have indicated our concern about the indiscriminate planting of mines in civilian areas. It is of great concern to us. I saw in Zimbabwe what happened there. There is a land-mine clearing operation that started 8 years ago that is still going on. There were so many land mines planted in that country, all over the border areas between Mozambique and Zimbabwe. It is a very extensive clearing operation which actually the U.S. Government has participated in as part of a rehabilitation program.

Mr. Gilman. Are PVO's able to do the kind of work they should be doing in SADCC areas in the front lines states? Or do they have any restrictions imposed on them? Are they free to help get the foodstuffs to those who are most in need?

Ms. Taft. In almost all the front line states they are. In Mozambique there are, of course, security considerations that prevent them going into all places at all times, and we are concerned about the end-use monitoring of some of the food that is going through the DPCCN, which is the government structure. Not that there are any questions of diversion, but there are questions about the end-use monitoring. I have gone back to the various grantees and asked them to submit additional proposals for adding expatriate staff to augment the ability to actually do end-use monitoring. The government of Mozambique is willing to allow this, and they have been willing to see an expansion of the ICRC program.

In Angola, it is a different story. There is very little ability to move throughout the country by the PVO's, with the exception of the ICRC, which has its own self-contained vehicles, planes and distribution system in the central plateau region. It is very important for us to continue to push to give them the access that they need. We are trying all avenues and ideas that you have. I mean, you all are the friendliest group we have in Congress because you really care about the same issues we care about. And we are trying very hard, knowing that ultimately it is not the U.S. Government employee who is going to go out and distribute the food. It will be the PVO's that go out there, and they have to have the authority and the ability to do that. That is the issue at this point.

Mr. Gilman. What are we doing to try to increase that capability?

Ms. TAFT. We are working with the U.N. and Mr. La Meuniere, the World Food Program, UNICEF, and ICRC. We think that collectively with the other donors we will be able to be successful in helping Angola reduce its nervousness, or perhaps reluctance, to allow more expansive distribution.

Mr. GILMAN. Are we making some progress in that area?

Ms. TAFT. As I mentioned earlier, we were very heartened by the fact that the government of Angola had heard how well things were going in Mozambique and sent a delegation to Mozambique to review the relationship between the government and the PVO's and tried to understand what they were. Now Angola has not had a lot of experience in this, and we are hoping that they will now come back and be willing to allow more participation. We are still waiting to find out whether the CARE Canada proposal to go in and do an assessment with the thought that they would then start a program will happen. If you have other ideas, we will entertain them.

Mr. GILMAN. Getting back to that mine issue that I raised, Mr. Crocker——

Mr. STACY. Stacy.

Mr. GILMAN. I am sorry. Some of the concerns that we have received are from the PVO people, who are reluctant to go in where there is a great deal of mining that is taking place. I would hope that we are doing much more in clearing the way for them to get in there, once you get permission, by taking care of this threat to their own safety.

Mr. STACY. We have indicated, in Angola, to parties there that this indiscriminate mining is of great concern. I mean, we really do deplore the level of violence that is going on there. The latest Amnesty International report, I think, Congressman, does make it clear that it is very difficult to assess, you know, the allegation of brutalities on both sides. Clearly this land mine issue is a very difficult one.

Mr. GILMAN. And we are not going to be able to get the PVO's to go in and really do some work unless we clear up that problem.

Mr. STACY. Well, in many instances they can fly food into areas and preposition it. I mean, in the case of Mozambique where there is also a considerable amount of land mine planting, and so on, I testified earlier that the ICRC is prepositioning food in about 40 areas. These are inside conflict areas, but people, of course, frequently move to food when they need it.

Mr. GILMAN. How do you get to it if you have land mines?

Mr. STACY. Well, sometimes there are tracks through there. I mean, it never ceases to amaze me how people are—I mean, I have seen people actually setting up farming operations in mine fields that are clearly marked "Danger—Land Mines," with fences up and red signs——

Mr. GILMAN. Well, I guess there is a better way of cultivating the land than by utilizing mines. I would hope that we really put some pressure on both of the forces to try to clear that up. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LELAND. Mr. Stacy, we are giving money to UNITA. We know that they are putting land mines in fields, agricultural fields. How can we continue to do that when we know what they are doing with them? Don't you think that it is understandable that the government reacts rather strongly to our doing that? How can we participate in helping feed hungry people and at the same time help the other side to kill people?

Mr. STACY. Congressman, I think that one has to take a balanced view of what is happening in Angola today. You know, the major militarization of that country has occurred as a result of the MPLA government. Mines are being laid on both sides. It is not just UNITA that is laying the mines.

Chairman LELAND. Mr. Stacy, I understand the political response, but let us talk about your response as a human being and let us deal with logic. On the one hand, we are helping to feed hungry people. Ms. Taft is assuring that we are doing all that we can. And on the other hand, we are giving UNITA money. We are giving them money to put land mines in agricultural fields that are blowing up children and people who are working in those fields; not necessarily the soldiers who the UNITA forces hope to defeat.

Mr. STACY. Congressman, whatever we are giving UNITA—and, quite frankly, I don't even have that information, but if I did, I couldn't comment on it in open hearing—it is certainly not military goods to attack civilian populations or mines to lay in farmers' fields. You know, UNITA is fighting a Soviet-Cuban expansionary force in that country. They represent one-third of the population.

Chairman LELAND. Then let us declare war on Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Mr. STACY. We don't want to declare war on anybody. We want to bring this conflict to a halt in Angola.

Chairman LELAND. But how are we going to bring a conflict to a halt when, in fact, we are supplying.

Mr. STACY. By getting all foreign forces out of that country——

Chairman LELAND. We have not that right, Mr. Stacy.

Mr. STACY [continuing]. Which will permit national reconciliation to take place.

Chairman LELAND. Do we have the right to get foreign forces out of another country.

Mr. STACY. We have that right if the government has indicated that they would like us to play that role, and frankly the government down there has indicated that they would like us to play that role.

Chairman LELAND. Which government?

Mr. STACY. They have asked that these talks——

Chairman LELAND. The Angolan government?

Mr. STACY. They have asked that these talks be restarted.

Chairman LELAND. Absolutely.

Mr. STACY. The Angola government would like to get those Cuban troops, I think, out of there. It is costing them a great deal of money. We would like to facilitate that process.

Chairman LELAND. Are you facilitating the process of getting the South African troops out of Angola? Do we have our Marines in Angola protecting the Chevron oil fields there?

Mr. STACY. No, we do not have our Marines in Angola and that is certainly well-known. What we do have, though, is a situation where we think that there is a possibility of implementing U.N. Resolution 435, which would get South African troops out of Namibia as well. And in the process we believe that the issues of civil strife in Angola can be solved without all of this outside interference and this massive militarization.

And, you know, I cannot emphasize enough——

Chairman **LELAND**. Well, wait a minute.

Mr. **STACY** [continuing]. That this militarization in Angola was taking place at a time over a 10-year period when we were not providing any assistance out there.

Chairman **LELAND**. It was illegal for us to do it. And by the quirk of elections, we were able to lift that restriction.

Mr. **STACY**. And that was voted by the Congress.

Chairman **LELAND**. Yes, unfortunately.

Mr. **EMERSON**. But we did.

Chairman **LELAND**. Yes, I know we did, and that is unfortunate. You know it is not right, Mr. Stacy.

But let me go on to another point. You have said more than once at this hearing that we are doing everything that we can do in Angola to feed hungry people. Is that not correct? I think Ms. Taft has said that, and I think you have said that; is that not correct?

Mr. **STACY**. What I said, Congressman, is we have responded with food and relief supplies in Angola. We have done everything to coordinate with the international community. I think that both in Angola and Mozambique we are ahead of the curve. I think our response has been a good one. I am contrasting that with what Congressman Wolpe had noted earlier, that we really got behind the curve in the Ethiopian drought.

If I were to say that we are doing everything we could do, obviously, there are still things we can do and I have identified many of those today. And that we are going to do.

Chairman **LELAND**. The Speaker of the House, Jim Wright, invited me earlier this year, in April, to go on his first foreign trip as Speaker to the Soviet Union. He asked me before we went to devise a plan by which we could get some cooperation with the Soviet Union in some field.

I devised a plan under which the Soviet Union and the United States would cooperate in Mozambique to deliver food to hungry people. We talked to Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Ligochev, Mr. Gromyko, and Mr. Shevardnadze. The Speaker put me very high on the agenda, and each time I made the proposal to each of those people, each of them said, "Yes, we will cooperate."

When we came back, I had a meeting in my office with Mr. Crocker, and I asked if he would meet with the Speaker on this issue which he did. Mr. Crocker said, at that time, what we ought to do is force the Soviet Union to contribute more money to the U.N. effort to help the famine relief effort in Mozambique. He implied that we don't want to cooperate with the Soviet Union to help hungry people in Mozambique; it would embarrass them to call on them to do more through the U.N.

The Soviets have a certain relationship, a very definite relationship in both Mozambique and in Angola. But because of the evolving relationship between the United States and Mozambique, perhaps I chose the wrong country to work in. I think that what we ought to do is work in Angola together.

Would you agree that the Soviets have certain transportation capabilities in Angola that we don't have, and possibly that the international community that is involved in helping to feed hungry people don't have, also? Will you agree with that?

Mr. **Stacy**. There are certainly a lot of Soviet trucks in Angola.

Chairman **Leland**. Then would you agree that, because of what Ms. Taft has said about the difficulties in transporting food in areas that are very difficult to get to, the United States could cooperate with the Soviet Union to deliver food to hungry people in Angola?

Mr. **Emerson**. Mr. Chairman, could I piggyback on that?

Chairman **Leland**. Oh, sure. Mr. Emerson.

Mr. **Emerson**. You know, why isn't the government of Angola, which has access to these trucks, making them available to deliver the food that we are willing to give? UNITA isn't there because we put them there. UNITA favors a negotiated settlement and free elections. The MPLA so far has resisted that. You know, the Soviet Union and Cuba aren't there to provide humanitarian assistance. We are trying to provide humanitarian assistance to both sides.

I think that needs to be a part of the equation we are discussing here.

Chairman **Leland**. Well, I appreciate the expansion of the discussion and welcome the opportunity for Mr. Stacy to respond.

Mr. **Stacy**. Well, you know, this is in the interest of humanitarian relief and making sure that not a single child dies that is not necessary. I can see why the optic of the Soviets and the Americans working shoulder to shoulder is very appealing, but I must say I find it curious. In the question of Mozambique, for instance, we have responded with a $74 million effort. The Soviet Union has responded with less than $300,000. You know, if we were to go into any kind of a joint program with them, they are, in fact, sharing a great deal of credit for this response when, in fact, they are doing very little or nothing.

Chairman **Leland**. Mr. Stacy, that is not fair. We are talking about expanding their interest. We are talking about using their fuel, their trucks, their transportation, their logistical apparatus to expand their interest in helping in a humanitarian way.

Mr. **Panetta**. Would the gentleman yield?

Chairman **Leland**. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. **Panetta**. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

You know, I guess all of us have a certain knee-jerk reaction when issues like this come up. But I guess to some extent what the chairman is doing is trying to challenge the process. You know we all have our standard responses when it comes to the Soviets and the Cubans and this group and that group, and we all kind of have our standard way of saying, well, why aren't they doing that or why aren't they doing this or how come they are not spending more, why aren't they going here. I mean, we can all play that game and we have been playing that game. That has been U.S. policy whether it is a Democratic administration or a Republican administration.

But at some point, somebody with a little imagination and a little guts should try to reach for this kind of potential solution. I think that would be a dramatic example to the world and, if the

Soviets tried to play that game, they would embarrass themselves. And all I think the chairman is saying is, why not? Why not try something like this as a symbol to the world that we can rise above the kind of BS that we banter in diplomatic circles? Just take a chance, that is all he is saying. And, you know, I think it is worth doing. I really do.

Mr. **Emerson**. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Leland**. Let me first, before I yield to the gentleman from Missouri, thank the gentleman from California for further clarifying my position. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. **Emerson**. Mr. Chairman, I don't object to what Mr. Panetta has been saying here at all. Let us challenge them. But I think maybe one reason they haven't been challenged is the Soviet Union doesn't have a very good track record in providing humanitarian assistance anywhere, including to its own people. You know, we saw what happened in Ethiopia. Why didn't they provide the transportation in Ethiopia? You know, the government of Angola apparently could request these trucks be put to the use of authorities that are willing to distribute food or trying to distribute food to their people, but it hasn't been done. Fine. Go ahead and challenge them. What is the record to indicate that they would respond?

Chairman **Leland**. Well, it is actually from the Ethiopian famine of 1984-85 that I got the idea. While the Soviets did not respond in the way that they should have at the beginning, eventually we were using Soviet trucks in Ethiopia. It was great to see bags that were stamped, "Food from the people of the United States of America," delivered by Soviet trucks to Ethiopian people. Why can't we do the same thing here, Mr. Stacy?

Mr. **Emerson**. Fine. Why not? Why are we attempting to paint ourselves as the bad guys trying to do nothing when, in fact, we are trying to do something?

Chairman **Leland**. No, Mr. Emerson. You missed my point altogether. If we are not realizing our greatest potential to deliver food to hungry people in Angola, then we are not doing enough. By the admission of Mr. Stacy and by the admission of Ms. Taft, both said that we have a very difficult problem with transportation. The Soviets have transportation. Let us get together with them. I mean, we can get together with them in Switzerland and a lot of other places to talk about arms agreements. Let us talk about feeding hungry people together. Can we do that?

Mr. **Stacy**. Let me respond, if I can, Congressman. Obviously, this is a terribly appealing idea.

Chairman **Leland**. Thank you.

Mr. **Stacy**. But——

Chairman **Leland**. Why don't we end the discussion right there? [Laughter.]

Mr. **Stacy**. If you will let me finish my response, if I may.

Chairman **Leland**. I am afraid of the "but." [Laughter.]

Mr. **Stacy**. You know, we normally respond in these kinds of crises in an international framework. We have found over the years that to do otherwise, not to work through the U.N. system, through international PVO's, everybody coming together—that we just don't do it well unless we work in that kind of an international framework. Why does the Soviet Union not really join in that international framework? In other words, this sort of joint effort on our part, it would seem to me there is a risk that you begin to do something in parallel to any international effort.

But let me say that, you know, in light of the recent developments in our overall relationship with the Soviet Union, I think that this is an idea that we ought to take a fresh look at.

Chairman LELAND. Can you and I work on this together? And let us get Mr. Crocker to stop saying, "Mickey, this is not African policy; this is East-West policy." It is humanitarian policy, as far as I am concerned.

Mr. STACY. Well, I mean, it is quite clear to me that there are many things that the Angolan government could do right now—right now, today—that would begin to apply some of the Soviet resources to this food problem. Maybe that would be a good place to begin.

Chairman LELAND. I understand that. Now Mr. Emerson leaned over to me a little while ago—I hope he doesn't mind me divulging that confidence—and he said: "Mickey, you know, is there anything that we can do? Why don't we go over there and see if we can work out some of these problems with the State Department?"

During the 1984-85 famine in Ethiopia, U.S. A.I.D. asked me to talk to Chairman Mengistu, about allowing more U.S. A.I.D. monitors to go into Ethiopia. That was during our trip there. Mr. Emerson and Mrs. Roukema and the rest of the delegation were so effective in 1984 when we went there that Chairman Mengistu said, "We certainly will allow that to happen." And what happened? They allowed more U.S. A.I.D. monitors to go in. That is a role that we played there.

I know Mr. dos Santos, Mr. Wolpe knows Mr. dos Santos as do other Members of Congress—and I am sure that Mr. dos Santos would meet very willingly with Mr. Emerson and the minority side. Maybe by that conduit we can resolve some of these problems that we are talking about and maximize our efforts to reach those in need in Angola.

Mr. STACY. I—again, I——

Chairman LELAND. So let the Soviet Union get some credit. So what, if hungry people are served.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I am going to allow the panel not to hear my foreign relations speech. I would like to ask some direct questions, and I don't want speeches back from you, if you don't mind.

First of all, you may have been misguided in your thought patterns about my questions about Zimbabwe. However, I want to assure you that I don't want Mr. Carter embarrassed, and I was embarrassed in Zimbabwe along with five other Members of Congress regarding a discussion we had with the Deputy Prime Minister. But beyond that, would you say that in Zimbabwe primarily the reason that they are feeding themselves and exporting to their neighbors is primarily because of privatization of agriculture and the retainage of a nucleus of agriculture left over from days of other governments involved there?

Mr. STACY. That has been a very big factor, yes.

Mr. **Smith**. You mentioned in your testimony that we send about roughly $75 million to Mozambique. Do they receive other types of aid from this Government besides that?

Mr. **Stacy**. That $75 million, sir, is a total figure which is an aggregate of the emergency food relief as well as our regular program, which I think this last year was $9.8 million, of the bilateral program.

Mr. **Smith**. That is the total amount of money that is sent to that country by the United States?

Mr. **Stacy**. Yes.

Mr. **Smith**. Seventy-five plus 9.8?

Mr. **Stacy**. No. It is $75 million incorporating the $9.8 million.

Mr. **Smith**. Total?

Mr. **Stacy**. For fiscal year 1987, just concluded, it was $75 million.

Mr. **Smith**. For any purposes?

Mr. **Stacy**. Emergency food relief and the regular aid program which is in the private sector; yes, sir.

Mr. **Smith**. Are there other types of aid going to Mozambique beyond——

Mr. **Stacy**. From other donors?

Mr. **Smith**. Yes.

Mr. **Stacy**. Yes, a considerable amount.

Mr. **Smith**. No. No, I mean from this Government, taxpayer money.

Mr. **Stacy**. That is all.

Mr. **Smith**. OK. And you mentioned, and I was going to ask you, that the Soviet Union's contribution to this horrible situation in Mozambique is about $300,000; is that correct?

Mr. **Stacy**. No. I am sorry. The $300,000 was what they pledged at Geneva for assistance to the emergency.

Mr. **Smith**. Have they sent it?

Mr. **Stacy**. I have no idea, sir.

Mr. **Smith**. What other types of aid does the Soviet Union send to Mozambique?

Mr. **Stacy**. Principally military aid, but also people that are technical advisers.

Mr. **Smith**. How much worth?

Mr. **Stacy**. I don't have a quantification on that, sir. We would find that out for you. But it is substantial. I might say, though, that the numbers of technical advisers, Soviet and Eastern Bloc technical advisers have been declining rapidly in Mozambique and there are now a greater number of Western technical and economic advisers in that country.

Mr. **Smith**. So you could say that the Soviet Union is sending a substantial amount of military equipment to Mozambique and practically no aid for food for starving people. Could you say that?

Mr. **Stacy**. That is correct. Yes.

Mr. **Smith**. Then, if we are guilty in Angola of anything, surely the Soviet Union must be terribly guilty in Mozambique. That is a statement you don't have to answer.

The accountability of funds issue is one I am interested in because I think that is at the core of the whole question of the delivery of food systems. Ms. Taft, I was pleased to hear your thoughts regarding the accountability of some of our food practices. And I think you mentioned in Ethiopia you had hard numbers, that only 1 percent was being diverted, and I think that is——

Ms. **Taft**. Well, not diverted, unaccounted for.

Mr. **Smith**. OK. Well, stolen.

Ms. **Taft**. Well.

Mr. **Smith**. OK. Lost.

Do you have any numbers, and I know you mentioned that there is a problem in Mozambique. Do you have any numbers in Mozambique?

Ms. **Taft**. No. Nor any evidence that there are any diversions. The only concern that we have in terms of monitoring is that there is not enough end-use monitoring by expatriates from private voluntary agencies. We are going to work with them to try to fund more people to go into these areas and actually see what the final distribution is.

It is also important to have them validate the numbers of affected populations because the source of all of these numbers is the government of Mozambique.

Mr. **Smith**. Well, you know, here again I don't think the American people, even though they grouse about this government spending too much money—which it does—but when you are talking about feeding starving people and children around the world, I don't think they would object at all to these efforts. I think they do object to the fact that we may be feeding armies of governments that oppose us. We may be diverting funds that were directed to feed starving people and they are being used for another purpose like alien or foreign governments.

Chairman **Leland**. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. **Smith**. I think that is what they would object to.

I will yield to the chairman.

Chairman **Leland**. Is the gentleman by his statement suggesting that the Angolan government is opposed to the U.S. Government?

Mr. **Smith**. I didn't say anything about Angola, did I?

Chairman **Leland**. I thought it was Angola. Oh, I am sorry.

Mr. **Smith**. I thought I was being general in my remarks. I didn't mention Angola.

Well, I would assume that the standing government in Angola is not feeding their own people, so I would throw them in the category of Mozambique, which the standing government is not feeding its people.

Chairman **Leland**. I understand. But the gentleman made a statement that the American people would be upset if we were giving money to governments that are opposed to our government.

Mr. **Smith**. I said that I think the American people would object to sending funds for food to governments that are alien to the United States. I think that is true, if those foodstuffs were being diverted to the armies or to the government.

Chairman **Leland**. I understand. Thank you.

Mr. **Smith**. I understand there still is in place, Mr. Stacy, an agreement, a pact between Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, and I understand that the borders between those countries remain open, and I also understand that most of the foodstuffs that are available, particularly to Mozambique, travel north across that border. I guess the question is, without that agreement, how much worse would the famine be in Mozambique if the South African government overnight were to shut down the border between those two nations?

Mr. STACY. Well, clearly, if there was ever a border shutdown, it would exacerbate the situation. As you probably know, Congressman, the capital of Maputo even gets its electricity via South Africa, or a large part of it. So, obviously, they have tremendous leverage which they could apply, but they have not chosen to go that far. Actually, we have been encouraged recently by a new mixed commission between those two governments that is meeting, which involves not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but other agencies in the South African government. We are encouraged by what appears to be a new effort to try to honor the Nkomati agreement, and we think that if the South Africans would honor that fully including, perhaps, stopping support for RENAMO that that would go a long way toward ameliorating the food situation.

Mr. SMITH. Do we have direct information that the South Africans indeed are supporting RENAMO?

Mr. STACY. I think that we have testified in the past that there has been evidence.

Mr. SMITH. Has that been increased recently? Is that after 1985?

Mr. STACY. I don't have the recent information on that or hard information that I could testify here today as to whether it has been increased as of recent. I have the government of Mozambique statements and they believe that it is continuing, and that is of substantial concern to them. We, on our part, have strongly encouraged the South African government to honor the agreement that they signed.

Mr. SMITH. Well, it is interesting, isn't it, another kind of anomaly in the world, that indeed if South Africa is supporting RENAMO, which is an attempt to overthrow the Mozambican government, which really only controls Maputo at this point, and they don't use their efforts to shut out the lights and shut down Maputo totally, and shut down the border, which they could absolutely create havoc in Mozambique should they choose.

Mr. STACY. I think the government of South Africa, I think they view the Chissano government as one that they could very much work with. We have seen every indication of that: they have had meetings, envoys have gone, there are these new commissions that have been announced. I think the government is in control of a lot more of its territory than just Maputo despite press allegations to the contrary.

Mr. SMITH. Back to Mozambique. Does the Soviet Union, in your estimation, provide more than $75 million worth of military assistance to Mozambique annually?

Mr. STACY. The Soviet Union?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. STACY. Undoubtedly, yes.

Mr. SMITH. Undoubtedly. Thank you. I appreciate that.

I just want to make the point, Mr. Chairman, I think you selected the right country. Obviously, if the Soviet Union were as interested as we are in providing food for starving people, the first effort we ought to make is go to Mr. Gorbachev and say: "Change the military assistance to Mozambique to food and we will match every bit of food that you send to Mozambique with food." Now that is a challenge we ought to send him, and I will join you.

Chairman LELAND. I tell you what, Mr. Smith. What we will do is you and I will go to the Soviet Union and we will let you tell Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. SMITH. I might not get out. I don't know about that. [Laughter.]

Chairman LELAND. You have a certain amount of diplomatic immunity, as a matter of fact, probably more than I have since, in fact, your party is in the White House.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I am going to raise this. I am going to meet with the equivalent of the Secretary of Agriculture in the Soviet Union, he is also a member of the Politburo—that is the job that Gorbachev had before he became the leader in the Soviet Union—in Des Moines and in New York, and I am going to raise this issue with him. I am going to try to help you.

Chairman LELAND. Fantastic. I love you for it, Mr. Smith. [Laughter.]

I presume there are no other questions of our members. Mr. Stacy, you have been very patient—you, Ms. Taft and your colleagues, and we certainly appreciate your testimony, your responses to the questions. We will keep the record open for the purpose of getting responses from you and your colleagues as we submit them to you in writing. Your responses in writing will be placed in the record at the appropriate place, without objection.

Mr. STACY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the committee for the opportunity to hear us out today. I can honestly say that we look forward to working with the Congress, both with Mr. Wolpe's committee and your committee, to do everything we can to respond to these emergencies and to do it properly. We share your concerns.

Chairman LELAND. Mr. Stacy, I look forward to working with you and the Soviets in helping to feed hungry people in Africa. Thank you very much.

I would now like to introduce our second panel. I welcome Ms. Peggy Dulany, a friend who participated in a trip to Angola made earlier this year and a very outspoken observer of the situation in Angola. I also welcome Ms. Carol Capps, with Church World Service, who returned a little over a week ago from a trip to Mozambique.

If Ms. Dulany would like to begin by making a brief opening statement, followed by a statement from Ms. Capps, the members will then have questions for you both. We thank you very much, not only for your appearance here, but also for your patience. We understand, too, that you were prepared to come before, and some of you came, when we had to postpone our hearing. And you are back again, and we certainly appreciate that. Thank you very much.

Ms. Dulany.

STATEMENT OF PEGGY ROCKEFELLER DULANY, UNITED NATIONS U.S./AFRICA TASK FORCE

Ms. **Dulany**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Peggy Dulany. I am president of the Synergos Institute and a member of the board of the African American Institute. I am a private citizen concerned with progress and development in Southern Africa.

To give you some context for how I came to be interested in this, since I am not professionally involved with Angola, let me first explain how I came to have contact with that country and how I came to go there in November of 1986 and January of 1987.

My father, who is David Rockefeller, former chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, had visited Angola in 1983. As one of the first Americans to visit after Jose Eduardo dos Santos became president, his visit was remembered positively by the Angolans. Consequently, when I met with the Angolan delegation at the African American Institute Conference in Gabon, I was warmly greeted. The fact that I speak Portuguese also made communication easier. Later that year, when President dos Santos came to the United States and I called upon him with my father, he extended an invitation for me to visit Angola, which I was only able to accept a year later.

My intention in telling you what I saw in Angola, which I will do in a second, is to try to relate the hunger and devastation to the war that is ravaging that country, but in particular to the kind of war that UNITA is waging against the government of the MPLA. War is, under any circumstances, gruesome and abhorrent. But countries that take that route expect their soldiers to die, their civilians to undergo hardships, and the country as a whole to experience some degree of want. That is different, I would argue, from a conscious policy of attacking peasants, raiding villages, destroying crops, and planting mines in access roads to agricultural areas.

The hunger you have asked me to describe in Angola is not a result of the mismanagement of that government, which no doubt exists, or of the basic fact that that country is at war, for Angola is a rich country that used to produce surpluses of food. It is a function of the way that war is being waged by the so-called Freedom Fighters who claim they want to liberate it from its current government.

On my second trip to Angola, in January of 1987, the government representatives organizing our trip had proposed that we go to the province of Bie, in the center of the country, to its capital city of Kuito and the surrounding rural areas. They had set up visits for us to an orphanage; an orthopedic hospital, where recent amputees were recovering from stepping on mines by UNITA forces; a dislocation camp for people who had to leave their villages because of attacks by UNITA guerrillas; and the Benguela Railroad.

The reality of that orphanage was ugly and sad, as you will remember, Mr. Chairman. Children, well dressed and well disciplined, mostly stared at us with vacant, uncomprehending eyes, even while singing songs of welcome to greet us, clapping their hands. Those whom we visited, 98 of them, were all from a few weeks old to 5 years old; the others, 600 at this point, had all gone to school.

The clinic of the orphanage was small and neat, but almost bare of supplies. Nurses proudly showed us two fat folders of handwritten charts on each child—charting their growth, giving the history of their vaccinations and illnesses—fighting the malnutrition with which nearly all the children were initially inflicted. A tiny refrigerator held the vaccine and, when the electricity failed, a generator maintained it at constant temperature—courtesy of UNICEF. UNICEF also used to send milk and a grain mixture, which came from U.S. A.I.D., which was apparently helping the children's nutrition and growth a great deal, but that had not been coming now for several months.

A Cuban doctor was running the orthopedic hospital and took us to several rooms to see the injured. In the first, about 10 men lay silently in beds whose sheets were mainly stained with blood. Under the covers one could see the flat places where arms and legs should have been. The doctor described to us what had happened to them. Most had been walking to or from work in the fields when a mine exploded underneath them. Some had been victims of the frequent UNITA hit-and-run attacks on villages.

We moved to the next room, this one full of women, one of whom seemed to be missing both legs and at least one arm. She was just a small lump under the covers, her eyes wide and staring as they followed us around the room.

And then, as if that wasn't bad enough, we went to the children's room. Again, bloody sheets, stumps of legs and arms. The children were not as self-conscious; they were not covered with a sheet, so the mutilation was more evident. One child, a boy, I think, although I am not sure, lay on his back with two short pieces of his thighs protruding into the air, one arm bandaged and the other lying limply by his side.

The dislocated people's camp, run by the Red Cross, was just outside the city, near the airport. On the way, we noticed that the corn was growing up almost against the houses. We were told the people didn't use to plant corn like that. But now it has become too dangerous to go out into the fields to plant because the little footpaths where Savimbi's troops—that is where they plant their mines. As a result, this fertile country—and one could see that almost anything could grow there—is lying largely fallow, and there was hunger in this rich province of Bie, which used to be known as the bread basket of Angola. Nor could food easily be brought in from outside because the railroad is frequently attacked, roads are mined, and convoys attacked.

The refugees were singing a song as we arrived, led by several women in the group. One of them, we were told, was walking home from the field one day, her baby slung on her back and her husband walking with her, when she heard shots. As she ran to escape, she felt liquid dripping down her legs. Her baby had been shot, and died, the bullet stopping there and not reaching her. Her husband too was killed. She had come alone to the camp. She looked as though she too might rather have died.

This story is brief, nonstatistical and, without a doubt, incomplete. Anyone who wants to know more of the numbers can read the UNICEF report, the U.N. status report on the Emergency Situation in Africa, which is issued monthly, or the U.S. Committee for Refugee's Issue Paper.

I offer, however, in addition some observations on the situation in Angola and our Government's role in it in the context of the situation of hunger. These observations are based on reading, as well as conversations with many Americans, Angolans, and Southern Africans. They are broader than the subject of hunger because, as I posited at the beginning, that hunger is a direct result of the war and will not end until the war is resolved. So, while we should, of course, be concerned with relief measures, the bulk of our energy should be devoted to finding ways to resolve that conflict.

Savimbi may have a true constituency, although it would appear to be tribally, and not nationally, based. But he is making no effort to win the hearts, minds, or even stomachs of the rest of the country. His war is not being fought around the issue of ideology, although he may say so for the benefit of his American or South African supporters, for what sort of ideology could support the tactics used by UNITA. The attacks are being launched at the direct expense of the Angolan people. Power and control are the issues.

The people of our country and our Government have differences with the expressed philosophy of the Angolan government, as we do with that of our Communist and Socialist regimes. Yet, in these other cases, we maintain diplomatic relations with nearly all of these other governments, and in most cases we do not provide aid to those trying to overthrow them.

It is true that the support Angola receives from the governments of Cuba and the Soviet Union is of concern to us. It should not have been entirely surprising, however, that this occurred, given our longstanding opposition to the MPLA and our refusal to help them as they were getting started.

It is too late to imagine what might have happened had we pursued a different strategy. It is not too late to pay attention to how a different strategy might affect the current situation. Over the last year, whether out of desperation or a shift in views, the Angolan government has put out many feelers, hoping for an improvement in relations with the United States that could lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations. They have maintained good business relations with our private sector and have sought ways to improve those ties. They have even asked for help in the management of their business and economy from American and European business people, indicating an openness to making significant changes in their economic system.

In the last 2 months, the Cubans, too, have expressed a desire to resolve the conflict and a willingness to negotiate directly along with the Angolans the timing and conditions of a Cuban troop withdrawal. The dilemma, though, is how can the Angolans let the Cubans pull back when Savimbi, strengthened by the military assistance that we and the South Africans are providing him, ravages the countryside and destroys the economy.

Yes, the MPLA has made many mistakes, both political and economic; President dos Santos recently admitted as much. We are justified in our criticisms of the regime for those mistakes. We are not justified in our continued support of a group whose clear strategy is one of destruction of people and land, and whose resultant impact is the destruction of the country.

Our Government recently refused the Angolan government's request for humanitarian and food aid on the grounds that the MPLA was misallocating its funds to the war instead of taking care of its people. How could they be acting otherwise? Other than by giving up, how could a government at war reduce its resources to the fighting of that war, especially when its enemy is receiving from us and the South Africans resources which Savimbi himself has said are playing a decisive role in that war? Whatever our criticism of the MPLA, our war is surely not against the Angolan people. Yet how could they perceive otherwise when we fund a strategy that attacks them directly and then refuse to assist them in their anguish?

Hunger is the presenting issue in Angola in this committee, but let us be clear about what is causing that hunger and what must be done to end it. It is the war, but in particular, the war strategy of Savimbi's UNITA, the group our Government has chosen to support. We must not and need not be the only ones to change our policy. The South Africans, the Cubans and the Angolans must all come to the table willing to make concessions. Now appears to be the time when at least the latter two are willing to do so.

So I urge you on this committee to see the issue on which you are focusing today, the issue of hunger, in its larger context, to use your influence with others in our Government to change its policy, and to bring to bear pressure on the South African government to make changes in response to agreed upon concessions from the other side. This must happen if the war and hunger in Angola are to end.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LELAND. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dulany appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 67.]

Chairman LELAND. Ms. Capps.

STATEMENT OF CAROL CAPPS, CHURCH WORLD SERVICE/LUTHERAN WORLD RELIEF

Ms. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Carol Capps. I represent Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief. I visited Mozambique from September 21 to 28, and while there had the opportunity to visit Inhambane province, north of the capital, Maputo, and to see for myself some of the devastation that has occurred in the countryside and some of the tragedy that has befallen the Mozambican people. My descriptions, impressions, and conclusions in many ways resemble those that you have just heard from Peggy Dulany about Angola.

I would like to make several points. Other persons in our group visited other provinces—Zambezia and Gaza, specifically—and our experiences in each of the three provinces were very similar. Also, from conversations with other people, I learned that the same kinds of things are happening in other provinces, in fact, all over Mozambique. What we witnessed was the effects of a rural terrorism that is destroying the social and physical infrastructure of the countryside, and it is killing, mutilating, and terrifying people in towns and throughout the countryside of Mozambique.

I visited the small town of Camine, which is the site of a Methodist mission that had been attacked on September 2nd. We saw the blackened interior of shops that had been looted and burned, a school that had been shelled and substantially damaged, and the power station where a new generator that had been installed just a few weeks earlier had been totally destroyed. We saw houses that had burned to the ground and learned that several elderly persons had lost their lives because they were just too weak to flee as the banditos were approaching. Nine people had been killed in this town and five, including a Methodist pastor, had been taken captive. When we left Mozambique nothing more had been heard about the captives.

The town was very quiet when we were there because most people had fled, including the hundreds of displaced people who had built make-shift shelters at the edge of town after fleeing from other parts of the countryside to seek security close to the town.

We also visited a hospital in the town of Maxixe in the same area, where there were survivors of bandito attacks. We saw people who had lost arms or legs, who had gunshot wounds, and who had been beaten. Many of the people we saw were children of all ages; and, in talking to them, we learned that many of them did not know where their parents were. Some of them did know that their parents had been killed.

While we were there we talked with Mark Van Koevering, and some of you may have heard radio reports or read news accounts of Mark's experience in Homoine, a town that was attacked by banditos in July. He described to us how the town's defenses had quickly been overrun by the better-armed banditos, how women and children were gunned down as they fled, and how he was absolutely certain that he and a Mozambican friend also would be killed as they huddled for 10 hours in a storeroom behind a bathroom.

Those in our group who went to Gaza province visited the town of Manjacaze where 94 people were massacred in an attack on August 10th. They described a similar pattern to what we had seen: wanton killing and destruction of the infrastructure—the power supply, water pumps, a cashew nut factory, the bank, a hotel, and stores.

Those in our group that visited Zambezia province, north of Gaza and Inhambane—and Roy Stacy referred to Zambezia as one of the harder hit areas—returned with even more graphic descriptions of the chaos resulting from this terror in the countryside. In the district town of Vila da Maganja they visited a relocation center for incoming displaced persons, and they met a family wearing nothing but small pieces of barkcloth as well as other persons who had been captured by the banditos and had escaped.

They also visited the town of Luabo, which formerly had a large sugar refinery. It was attacked in July and the town was virtually destroyed. Thousands of acres of sugar cane were burned down, fires had been set in the control room of the sugar refinery, and machinery had also been destroyed. The group was told that the banditos used chemicals to burn what normally does not burn. They saw the local hospital where all that remained was operating room equipment in the midst of a concrete shell that had been blackened by fire. The district administrator in this area said that at least 700,000 people had been affected by the violence in this province of 2.5 million.

A second impression that I took from my visit was that in the midst of all of the terror and in spite of the fact that I was terribly demoralized by what I saw, I was also impressed by the resilience of the people and the ways that people find to cope with the situation of terror. As we were returning to the town of Maxixe, we saw hundreds of people along the road, coming back from the countryside, and we were told that a lot of these people who are displaced, some 60,000 of them, and who stay in small shelters around the town at night, walk possibly as far as 2 to 3 hours in the morning to go back to their farms, so that they can work their fields and provide sustenance for their families. These same people in the afternoon walk back to town, so that they will be in the relative security of the town where there are soldiers, a garrison of soldiers, in the evenings and not be subject to attacks by banditos in the countryside.

We also saw children sitting under the trees. The out of doors has become the classroom of many because schools have been destroyed, though undoubtedly this is becoming more difficult now that the rainy season has arrived.

We asked time and again of people, "Who are the banditos who cause this terror?" and each time the answer we received was a very similar one. Both the Mozambicans and the expatriates we talked with believe that most of the violence is perpetrated by groups linked to RENAMO, the MNR. People spoke of parachute drops and other activities near the South African border as evidence that the banditos receive weapons and supplies from outside. They suggested links both to the South African military and also to private right-wing South African and Portuguese groups working from South Africa. They acknowledge that some of the attacks may indeed be carried out by lawless elements taking advantage of the chaos in the countryside, but they emphasize that the well-planned and carefully targeted nature of the violence focused on social and physical infrastructure points to RENAMO.

People also said that the objectives of RENAMO are difficult to understand because they seem basically to be nihilistic—destruction of infrastructure and wanton killing of people. No clear political goals have been articulated by RENAMO. RENAMO has no visible popular base of support in Mozambique. Nor does territorial control appear to be a major feature of their style of operation. The banditos attack mainly by night and they return into the bush during the day. Their sole objective seems to be to destabilize and weaken Mozambique to the point of collapse.

Another impression that I came away with is that, while there is hunger in Mozambique, the greatest hunger is not a hunger for food but a hunger for peace. In this sense, we must look at the emergency in Mozambique as part of the larger crisis of Southern Africa that, in turn, is linked to policies of governments and people that seek to destabilize the region. UNICEF, as Peggy Dulany has pointed to, in its publication Children on the Front Line and in other publication, has pointed out very graphically and has given considerable statistics on the havoc that has been wreaked in Mozambique and other front line countries in Southern Africa because of the violence and destabilization.

I remember in particular the children that we saw there, and not only the physical damage but the psychological damage of being maimed for life and of seeing parents and relatives killed.

My final point relates to what I think the United States can do to assist Mozambique. Certainly Mozambique needs emergency aid and assistance for reconstruction and development, and I was very pleased to hear Mr. Stacy emphasize the need for assistance for rehabilitation in Mozambique. Food aid is needed, but even more importantly, the seeds and tools for agricultural rehabilitation of the farmers who have been displaced by conflict, and various other types of support for rebuilding the economy. Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief are very pleased that the U.S. Government is providing such aid. We urge its continuation and its expansion.

The hunger for peace, however, we feel requires more. As a start, we urge prompt congressional passage of House Concurrent Resolution 189 condemning RENAMO atrocities and referring specifically to the Homoine massacre. This resolution would be a clear expression of understanding and sympathy on the part of the American people for the pain the people of Mozambique are suffering as a result of continuing and increasing rural terrorism.

We also urge support for as high a level of funding as possible, and at least the $50 million proposed in the fiscal year 1988 foreign aid legislation, for SADCC. This funding, we believe, should be part of a continuing flow of support for the SADCC countries including Mozambique, and I might also add Angola, for improving transport networks and increasing training in order to put those countries in a stronger, more independent position in the region. We are very disturbed that there may be prohibitions attached to this funding that would not allow it to be used for Angola and Mozambique. They are part of the region, destabilization is very real in those countries, the infrastructure, the regional transport infrastructure goes through those countries and we believe that support should be for all of them.

And, finally, but not insignificantly—perhaps most importantly—we encourage redoubled U.S. efforts to press for solutions to political problems in the region that will put an end to the violence and terrorism in Mozambique and elsewhere. That violence is destabilizing and draining economies and affecting, in fact, claiming the lives of many innocent victims.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LELAND. Thank you very much, Ms. Capps.

Ms. Dulany, could you tell us why you, a private citizen, have taken particular interest in the situation in Angola?

Ms. DULANY. Well, first I should say that I have particular in the situation in Southern Africa, but I think to some degree the situation in Angola epitomizes that crisis and, in particular, the role that our Government has played in Angola where it certainly would appear by our support for Mr. Savimbi, which the South Africans are also supporting, that we are taking a role that supports the South African government. That it seems to me has probably worsened U.S. relations with Africa in general, and probably with the Third World, more than any other single move that our Government has made.

Chairman **Leland**. As you know, the Angolan government in conjunction with the United Nations has estimated that over 2.7 million in Angola are in need of food assistance. In your visits to Angola, how serious did the food situation appear to be?

Ms. **Dulany**. I can't give a statistical answer to that. What I can say is that both in the city of Luanda there were people pawing around through large piles of garbage and in the province of Bie, as I mentioned, people were growing tiny plots of corn right next to their houses because they couldn't grow them elsewhere. The roads were mined and frequently attacked, so that food couldn't get either from the rural areas that still are producing to the city to feed the urban poor, nor could supplies get from the city to the rural areas to take care of the rural poor. So that I would have to conclude, without any statistical evidence of my own other than that of the reports which I have mentioned, that the situation is of extreme gravity.

Chairman **Leland**. Ms. Dulany, you have met with government officials in Angola?

Ms. **Dulany**. Correct.

Chairman **Leland**. And you have been able to communicate with them fairly freely, is that not correct?

Ms. **Dulany**. Yes.

Chairman **Leland**. We heard earlier from Mr. Stacy and also from Ms. Taft that it is very difficult for them to get an accurate assessment of the real problem of hunger in Angola. Do you get the sense that the Angolans would resist an opportunity for us to communicate with them or to collaborate with them or an official assessment of the food problem in Angola?

Ms. **Dulany**. Let me say first that in part because of the circumstances of the war, my guess is that it is very difficult for the Government itself to get an accurate assessment. However, that is different from not being willing to share whatever assessment they have with representatives from our government. My guess would be that as they have been willing to discuss negotiating a peace settlement, they would be even more eager to discuss the assessment of the food situation so that they could get some immediate help and relief.

Chairman **Leland**. In recent weeks, some administration officials and representatives of UNITA have claimed that the food crisis in Angola is the result of the Angolan government's excessive expenditures on its military and the resulting neglect of its people's needs. You have alluded to that earlier. Let me get you to clarify.

Do you feel that this is a major factor in creating the current crisis?

Ms. **Dulany**. Sir, can you restate the question?

Chairman **Leland**. Do you think that the real cause of the problems in Angola is the diversion of oil revenues for military purposes? Is that the real reason for the crisis and the famine there?

Ms. **Dulany**. No. I think the war is a major reason for the crisis, but when one is being attacked by a rebel group, presumably any government would choose to defend itself. Therefore, it seems to me difficult to claim that they should be not defending themselves in order to feed the people so that the entire government would fall.

Chairman **Leland**. What about all the discussion about the Cuban troops and the Soviets, their massive infusion of military aid and support there, the so-called mercenary troops there? From your perspective, can you give us your assessment of why they are there; if, in fact, you feel that they ought to leave right away, and what would happen if they did or if they did not?

Ms. **Dulany**. Well, my understanding—and I repeat, this is as an ordinary citizen—is that in fact the Angolans requested military and other kinds of assistance from both the Soviets and the Cubans. I think that all parties, including the Cubans—I don't know about the Soviets—would like to be able to pull back. It is a very costly war. The Cubans have recently said this. The Angolans have recently said this. But that is very difficult to do when the other side continues to be supported massively, principally by the South Africans; not in such huge quantities of dollars by the United States, but in terms of what the United States represents in the world symbolically with an enormous amount of moral support.

Chairman **Leland**. Ms. Capps, from your discussions with government and nongovernment officials involved in relief operations in Mozambique, what is your perception of the outstanding food and nonfood aid needs?

Ms. **Capps**. We were told by most of the people that we talked with that currently there are adequate food aid supplies in the country, though that could change at any time. The basic problem is distribution, and it is the same kind of two-way distribution problem that Peggy Dulany was talking about in Angola. The problem is distribution from the towns to the countryside because of the conflict and violence in the countryside. The problem is also distribution from the farms into the towns. We were told, for instance, by the CARE representative in Inhambane that twice over the last 6 months he was asked by the government, the DPCCN, the emergency arm of the government, to retain some supplies of food for sale in the town of Inhambane because the people there could afford to purchase food but there was no food in the town. It had not come in from the countryside.

There is no question that there is a continuing need for food aid, and I have seen an assessment for the marketing year of May 1987 to April 1988 that assesses that need at some 790,000 tons of food. The pledges from donors and the response from donors have up to this point been quite good.

So, what I am saying is, or what we were told by Mozambiqans is that at the moment the basic problem is not inadequate food aid, though that could be a problem in the future; but the problem is, rather, distributing it in the midst of conflict.

Chairman **Leland**. Do your organizations, in the course of delivering food to hungry people in Mozambique, have any real problems working with or through the Government of Mozambique?

Ms. **Capps**. No, we have not had problems. Actually, neither Church World Service nor Lutheran World Relief is directly operative in Mozambique. We work through our partner agency, the Christian Council of Mozambique. The Christian Council, in turn, cooperates with the DPCCN, and we were told by people, staff on the Christian Council that had responsibility for food distribution that 90 percent of the food aid which the Christian Council receives from European agencies, U.S. agencies, and from governments is channeled through the DPCCN. The remaining 10 percent of the food aid has been distributed directly through the churches. But, as you can see, the DPCCN is the major distributor of food aid for the Christian Council of Mozambique.

Chairman LELAND. Can you comment on the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of the food in Mozambique?

Ms. CAPPS. The assessment of people I talked with was that the DPCCN is quite effective. It does have adequate trucks. Of course, again, as in any conflict situation, convoys have to be set up with protection to get into many areas of the countryside. The one problem that was mentioned is the one that came up earlier in the discussion with Roy Stacy and Julia Taft; namely, it is difficult to monitor at the final point of distribution. And what we were told was part of the reason it is so difficult is, again, the violence in the countryside. When a truckload of food is delivered somewhere the driver and whoever is on that truck wants to get it unloaded and to get away as quickly as possible, and to get back to a safer area.

But I also understand that CARE is working closely with the DPCCN on logistics. In fact, CARE has a representative in all of the regional DPCCN offices to help on logistics. It is also trying to increase and improve this end-of-the-line monitoring.

Chairman LELAND. Is there any indication at all that RENAMO tries to stop food aid going into the countryside?

Ms. CAPPS. Yes, there have been attacks on convoys. Also, there have been RENAMO attacks on towns shortly after food has arrived in those towns. So that, obviously, RENAMO has been aware that food convoys were in the area and the banditos have come in to seize the food.

Chairman LELAND. Very good.

The gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to say to Ms. Capps that I was delighted to hear of your association with Lutheran World Relief and Church World Services because those were two of the organizations that when we went to Ethiopia, fast became favorites of ours. We saw firsthand the very effective job that you were doing there, and I don't think we could have done what we did there without the intermediary services of organizations such as those that you represent.

Ms. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Emerson. I will communicate that to my agencies.

Mr. EMERSON. Please do. I have talked about it a lot. In the period since we have been back, I have made many speeches about what we found in Ethiopia and I have always pointed to those two organizations as two of the very best that we observed.

Ms. Dulany, I think you and I may disagree somewhat on the politics of the situation in Angola, but we are not going to disagree on what our end result there should be, which is to assist hungry, starving people. I would just observe for the record that UNITA doesn't seem to be the impediment to a negotiated settlement in Angola or an obstacle in any way to free elections. As a matter of fact, everything that I have heard is that they are calling for that and have pledged their cooperation toward that end.

I might also say, you know, I do agree with General Sherman that war is hell in any circumstance, and there are going to be atrocities on either side. Just to put some balance in here, I have visited recently with Angolans, and Americans who have returned from Angola from their own fact-finding missions there, and they have described horror stories to me that were perpetrated by the other side. As an example, the MPLA perpetrates these atrocities and covers them up in such a way to point the finger at UNITA. I had one description of how someone had been taken from an MPLA jail, murdered, put in UNITA-occupied territory, and made to appear that this had been a UNITA atrocity, when clearly the evidence indicated that it was an MPLA atrocity; that is to say, there were markings put on this person that would indicate that this had been a UNITA person, when, in fact, there was documentary evidence to the fact that it had been an MPLA atrocity. In a situation of civil war, or war of any sort, there are going to be incidents of this sort. We don't condone any of them, but it is a fact of war.

I think we should look at who is on what side here, to address these problems, but I certainly think it would be wrong to leave the impression that it is a one-sided situation. It is just a comment and I invite you to respond if you wish to.

Ms. **DULANY**. Thank you, Mr. Emerson. I think there is always two sides to everything, and I can't comment on any specific atrocities. I am sure that there are always atrocities on both sides.

From what I have heard, it is not the policy of the MPLA government to commit such atrocities. From what I have heard about the way that UNITA is waging its rebellion, it is, in fact, a policy. And what disturbs me so profoundly, apart from the humanitarian concerns, presumably we could influence their policy of waging that war considerably more than we are. Now I am, of course, advocating that we don't support them at all. But given that we are supporting them, the very least we could do is impose on them much stronger sanctions than we have about the way in which they are waging that war.

Mr. **EMERSON**. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I might say I, as a member of the Agriculture Committee, and I am supposed to be at a luncheon that Chairman de la Garza is hosting for the Soviet Minister of Agriculture. And I want to go there and talk to him about some of the problems that we have been discussing here this morning. Good starting point. We don't have Gorbachev in hand, but we have his successor as Minister of Agriculture, and I assume he wouldn't be in that position unless he had some influence with Mr. Gorbachev.

Chairman **LELAND**. Not only that; he, obviously, sits in a very strategic situation as Minister of Agriculture, for that was the title that Mr. Gorbachev held before rising to the position of authority that he is in now.

Mr. **EMERSON**. Indeed.

Chairman **LELAND**. Well, I would hope, Mr. Emerson, that indeed you would raise those questions, particularly the challenges that have been raised to the State Department as to how they could begin to do more in Angola

I want to thank both of you for coming and participating today. This has been a very illuminating hearing. I promise you that this hearing has been unique, to say the least, and it will provide a lot of information for our efforts on behalf of Southern Africa in particular but also, for the efforts that we are waging as a select committee to try to end hunger in the world.

I might add that the uniqueness of this hearing has been the intervention of the political circumstances in the areas of concern—particularly Mozambique and Angola. I think it will be invaluable also as we pursue through the Foreign Affairs Committee and other committees of jurisdiction the problems, and hopefully resolutions to those problems, in the future. Your testimony has been invaluable to us. Your involvement, from this member's point of view, is just outstanding, and we encourage you to do as much as you can to continue your efforts, and we wish you godspeed.

Mr. **Emerson**. Mr. Chairman, before you bang the gavel, I ask permission that some statements could be submitted for the record. There were people who wanted to be here today to make comments who could not be; they couldn't arrange their schedules in time. Could we have permission to insert statements in the record and to exclude extraneous material?

Chairman **Leland**. Without objection, so be it.

We, then, on that note conclude our hearing. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the select committee was adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROY A. STACY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to address the Committee on the food situation in southern Africa. In view of the growing interest on this topic, I would like to provide background information for perspective and some key points regarding the U.S. response thus far to food and other emergency needs in Mozambique and Angola.

MOZAMBIQUE

Nature and Scope of the Food Crisis

The major food crisis in southern Africa at this time is in Mozambique. Mozambique is no stranger to food shortages, having suffered severely from the drought which gripped southern Africa 1981-1985, and in the past from other natural disasters and from economic policies which discouraged food production and distribution. At present, however, the primary cause of the food emergency in Mozambique is civil strife. Normal food production, distribution and marketing have been disrupted by attacks on farms, rail and road networks, as well as food relief convoys. Intense fighting between RENAMO and government forces in the central provinces has caused people to flee from their homes, abandoning farms or not planting crops.

As a result, the Government of Mozambique now estimates that some 3.2 million Mozambicans are considered at risk due to food shortages. Another 3.3 million rely on food assistance from the internatinal donor community, but they buy this food in the market and are not identified as being "at risk".

The U.S. Response

The United States has played a leading role in assessing the extent of the crisis and in organizing and contributing to the international community's response in Mozambique. In early January 1987, our Ambassador determined that a disaster situation existed and requested emergency food and disaster relief aid. In February, we called on the UN Secretary General to appoint a special coordinator for relief operations in Mozambique, which he did later that month. At the same time, AID dispatched an assessment team from Washington to review the status of relief efforts and lay the groundwork for our response to the UN's appeal for emergency aid. At a UN-sponsored pledging conference in Geneva in March, we made the following commitments:

-- 194,000 tons of food, worth about $68 million;

- -- $3.6 million dollars to private voluntary agencies for transportation, distribution, and monitoring of relief efforts;
- -- $3.4 million dollars to UNICEF for medicines and transport.

More recently, we pledged up to $1.2 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to assist its important work in delivering food to conflict areas of Mozambique. All told, U.S. humanitarian assistance in Fiscal Year 1987 to the Mozambique food crisis amounts to about $75 million, approximately one third of the total international response, making the United States the largest single donor.

Relief Assistance Issues

Accessibility of People At Risk: The greatest single difficulty associated with the relief effort is getting food to people in areas where RENAMO is active. Particularly in the central provinces of Zambezia, Tete, Sofala, and northern Niassa, RENAMO has impeded the movement of goods by hit and run attacks on food convoys and placement of land mines in roads. In this manner, the insurgents have restricted or interrupted access to large areas where in fact they have no control or administrative capacity. To deal with this problem, the

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), acting on behalf of the donor community, has been in contact with all parties to the conflict to arrange food deliveries in conflict areas--a task ICRC has performed with distinction in war-torn areas around the globe. The ICRC began delivering food and medicine in conflict areas of central Mozambique in June, and it expects to have delivered 1,500 tons of these vital supplies to 40 sites by the end of 1987.

We continue to believe the ICRC's efforts offer the best means of seeing that hungry people are fed in areas that are difficult to reach . In pursuit of this goal, we have had a series of consultations with ICRC and will work with them to strengthen their response capability. The ICRC is working to expand its operations, but it needs additional support from the Government of Mozambique, including access to additional supplies of food and medicine, to do so.

Refugee Assistance: During the past year, several hundred thousand Mozambicans have fled across their country's borders to escape the fighting--nearly 300,000 to Malawi alone. Feeding and caring for these refugees has placed an enormous burden on the resources of Mozambique's neighbors. As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, we do not normally earmark refugee assistance funds for a single country or region, but rather contribute 30 percent of UNHCR's overall budget for African refugees. Since the Mozambican refugees in Malawi are newly arrived and the subject of a new emergency program, the United States has specifically provided $950,000 to the UNHCR and $450,000 to the League of Red Cross Societies/Malawi Red Cross. In addition, we are making available 18,000 tons of food for Mozambican refugees in Malawi through the Food for Peace program.

Current Assessment:

As the current food crisis in Mozambique, and the international response to it, have unfolded, we have kept the situation under constant review through our AID mission in Mozambique and through visits from Washington-based disaster relief specialists. Most recently, a U.S. disaster relief assessment team visited Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Malawi August 19-September 10. They came to the following conclusions about the current situation.

-- There is a continuing and significant need for emergency food in Mozambique, and the Government of Mozambique, in cooperation with the international community is working to meet that need. Food is moving toward and getting to people who need it.

-- That said, the system needs to be improved to better pinpoint the scope of emergency requirements and insure that food reaches all who are at risk. The first step in this direction should be better coordination among the donors and between the donors and the Government of Mozambique.

-- The numbers of affected and at risk persons need to be verified systematically. Spot checks have indicated that current estimates are soft and need rigorous review.

-- The ICRC's program, which addresses the areas most affected by the insurgency, needs to be expanded and strengthened.

-- Mozambique has legitimate emergency problems, but it also has problems resulting from a history of inappropriate economic policies--which it is working hard to correct. In particular, the government needs to lift fixed price controls on transport rates so that private transport operators will be able to move supplies over a wider area. More generally, problems of this sort need to be addressed as part of the Government of Mozambique's ongoing economic reform program, in order to move from an emergency phase to a rehabilitation phase.

In the last few days, we have discussed these issues with the Government of Mozambique to work out improvements and solutions to specific delivery problems. With the coordinated work of the U.N., ICRC, PVOs and other donors, we can bring the Mozambican food crisis to an end.

ANGOLA EMERGENCY

Regarding the second "food crisis" of interest to the Committee, that in Angola, The U.S. has consistently demonstrated its willingness to respond positively to legitimate requests for humanitarian assistance for that country's people. Since 1981, in fact, the U.S. has provided over 78,000 metric tons of food, with a dollar value of more than $33 million, to NGOs operating in Angola. The bulk of this assistance has gone to UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The U.S. has already provided 12,000 metric tons of high protein food in 1987 to UNICEF and is reviewing a UNICEF request for an additional 22,000 MT to carry its program through December 1988.

Moreover, since the United Nations Emergency Operations Group report on the food situation in Angola was made public in June 1987, the Department has been engaged in a sustained effort to evaluate food availability in Angola. Other donors are also conducting their own assessments of the situation, and the World Food Program is reportedly preparing a well-documented project proposal calling for a program to handle 22,000 metric tons of food aid. Our OFDA and Refugee Program Bureau personnel are in close contact with these other donors and interested organizations such as the ICRC and UNHCR. Beyond our current efforts, we are prepared to participate in a well-managed and responsible international food relief effort for Angola, once the extent of the emergency needs are demonstrated and there is a more thorough assessment of logistical requirements to ensure effective distribution of relief commodities.

I wish to note, however, that there is a problem establishing the extent of the "urgent and extraordinary food needs" with respect to Angola which are referred to in your letter inviting my testimony. Granted, there are several reports projecting impending food shortages in Angola. The most comprehensive and notable of these reports was the Third Country Brief released on June 15th by the United Nations Emergency Operations Group. This report estimates that there are 690,000 displaced persons and 1 million urban destitute in Angola requiring 242,000 metric tons of food and $115 million in other assistance. While these numbers are plausible, the

Third Country Brief has not offered an explanation of how these figures were derived, other than to note that much of the raw data for the assessment was obtained from Government of Angola sources. We have also confirmed that the UN organizations represented in Angola have not been able to make fully independent assessments of the food crisis in the country.

Subsequent reports on Angola's emergency food needs have been issued by UNICEF, the U.S. Committee on Refugees, and the Mennonite Central Committee. All, however, draw on the data presented in the Third Country Brief.

There are serious analytical shortcomings in the UN report, especially with its primary premise that the country's worsening economic situation (and subsequent increased food aid requirement) is attributable to declining foreign exchange revenues (and thus reduced commercial food import capability) from the drop in oil prices. In fact, the price of oil has risen substantially since March of this year. With current production at over 300,000 barrels per day and a price of almost $19 per barrel, Angola will earn some $1.8 billion in oil revenues in 1987--an increase of $500 million over 1986 earnings. The rise in earnings has occurred at a time when international grain prices have been falling: we estimate that

$35 million would purchase the roughly 200,000 MT food grain shortfall calculated by the UNEOG in its June 1987 report. Nonetheless, and paradoxically, while oil revenues and buying power are up in 1987, commercial food imports by Angola have been cut by about one-third from 1986, or to one-half of 1985 levels.

We therefore do not believe that all food shortages in Angola can be blamed on warfare and lost oil revenues. Whatever the primary causes and the final numbers of people in need, it is clear to us that the government of Angola has the wherewithal to assume greater responsibility for Angola's at-risk populations, especially the large numbers of urban destitute.

In sum, the lack of objective, field-verified data is a real concern. We are encouraged, however, that several recognized international relief agencies are prepared to carry out assessments of the situation, the Angolan government permitting. So are other respected international relief bodies. One PVO, CARE/CANADA, has submitted a proposal to the Government of Angola offering to perform a comprehensive, independent assessment of need. The GOA has expressed an interest in such an assessment, going so far as to visit and view CARE/USA food relief operations in Mozambique, but has not yet responded to the proposal from CARE/CANADA. Yet it is this kind of independent survey that is needed to establish both the extent of the crisis and how best to respond to it. The ICRC is also considering a food needs assessment in Angola's Planalto Region where it has had operations for six years. We would view positively any independent evaluation of the at-risk population in urban and rural areas not currently served by the NGO community, and would be prepared to fund it.

Finally, a major obstacle to recognizing or attempting to ameliorate a food crisis in Angola is the absence of an official appeal by the Angolan government for a UN-coordinated relief effort, along the lines of the Mozambican appeal earlier this year.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to reemphasize my earlier comment that the U.S. government will do all that is necessary to respond to legitimate food and emergency needs in these two countries and in the region as a whole.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR ROY STACY

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MICKEY LELAND

Question. Could you tell us what the U.S. Government intends to do to meet the outstanding nonfood aid needs in Mozambique? We have learned, for example, that there is a need for boats to transport food up the coast and up river. The World Food Programme also has an outstanding appeal to fund its airlifts carrying food and other necessities to inaccessible regions. What does the U.S. Government intend to do to meet these and other nonfood needs?

Answer. As stated in recent testimony, most of the current needs outlined in Mozambique's 1987 appeal have been met. The U.S. Government has provided over $6 million toward nonfood aid projects including:

$2.2 million to CARE to support its ongoing logistics activities in Mozambique;

$580,719 to WVRO to manage an internal food transportation program in five provinces and to distribute AgPacks to farmers in Tete and Zambezia provinces;

$264,000 to Air Serve which provides airplane passenger service to A.I.D., CARE, and UNICEF for monitoring relief programs in isolated, affected areas;

$2 million to UNICEF to procure vital medicines for the GPRM Ministry of Health;

$1.2 million to ICRC to support its effort to provide assistance to affected populations throughout the country. The ICRC will use $200,000 for emergency medical needs and the remainder for logistical support.

The USG cannot meet all the emergency needs in Mozambique by itself and must count on other donors to do their fair share. For example, the Italian Government has assumed the responsibility from WFP for the emergency airlift and the Swedes are considering providing the required boats. Of course, we will consider new emergency requirements as identified and are already planning for continued emergency assistance in 1988.

Question. As you pointed out during the hearing, it appears that the emergency needs outlined in Mozambique's 1987 appeal have on the whole been met. However, since it is unlikely that the situation in 1988 will be much improved, more food and nonfood assistance will be needed to meet the continued needs. Is the U.S. Government prepared to maintain its commitment to Mozambique's emergency needs? Are advanced preparations being made in expectation of continued needs?

Answer. The U.S. Government expects there to be a continuing need for emergency relief in Mozambique in 1988 and is already preparing to provide additional assistance. A.I.D. is tentatively planning to provide roughly the same quantity of food aid in fiscal year 1988 as last year. Already, 6,500 MT of emergency title II food has been approved for World Vision's program.

As for nonfood aid, a fiscal year 1988 grant has already been made to ICRC for $1.2 million for its health and nutritional monitoring program. A second, $1.4 million tranche will be provided to UNICEF to continue its vital medicines program. Our other principal nonfood aid programs—those with CARE and World Vision—are already funded through March 1988. A.I.D. is already discussing with World Vision the continuation of its program beyond March 1988. An evaluation of the CARE program is scheduled for February 1988 which will serve as a basis for designing a fiscal year 1988 grant.

Question. You mentioned in the hearing that an adequate independent assessment of the emergency situation in Angola is needed before the U.S. Government will provide any substantial assistance. Could you tell us what efforts are underway by private and international organizations to make such an assessment? What is the U.S. Government doing to expedite this process?

Answer. Before I begin my answer, I wish to correct what may be an erroneous implication in the preface to your questions, which is the suggestion that the U.S. Government is not presently providing substantial assistance to Angola while awaiting an independent assessment of the situation. I stated in my testimony that since 1981 the United States has provided over 78,000 tons of food with a value of $33 million to NGO's operating in Angola. I would call this a substantial contribution.

Turning to your specific questions, UNICEF, the ICRC, and the U.N. Emergency Operations Group (under Charles La Muniere) are all presently engaged in conducting food needs and logistics assessments in Angola. We encouraged all three organizations to conduct such assessments and are pleased that they are addressing key issues at this time. A group of Canadian NGO's is also presently conducting an assessment of Angolan emergency needs. On November 10 a working-level meeting of Western donors in Geneva is being convened at our request to identify the practical essentials of a credible food needs assessment (information such as available food stocks in-country, transportation capacity, port situation, and monitoring capabilities, among others), and determine what data the donors already possess. Should the donors propose a comprehensive, multidonor assessment, the United States would be willing to participate, of course.

Question. Will the administration be making any contact, either formal or informal, with Angolan officials to determine what methodology was used to gather information for the Third Country Brief, what their current assessment of the need is, and how the Angolan Government could assist in making possible an independent assessment of the situation?

Answer. We do not intend to take any unilateral initiatives at this time with the Angolan Government regarding the current situation in Angola or the methodology used in preparation of the Third Country Brief. The brief is, you will recall, a U.N. report, not an Angolan Government publication, and we have raised with appropriate U.N. authorities our concerns regarding the methodolgy used by the U.N. field researchers. We have determined that the data used in the U.N. report were obtained principally from government ministries in Luanda and not corroborated by visits to the field. The U.N. is presently updating the brief and we hope the new version will address the issues we have raised.

Question. If a satisfactory independent assessment of the need in Angola can be made and the Angolan Government formally requests international assistance, will the U.S. Government provide its traditional share of the requirements?

Answer. If the case is well made for a true emergency food situation in Angola, and an international effort is mounted to address this emergency, then, yes, of course, the United States would consider a contribution to a multidonor emergency campaign. As for the level of the U.S. share, however, given the absence of an independent assessment of food needs and in-country carrying capacity, it would be inappropriate and imprudent of me to speculate on how much the United States will provide. In the interim, we will continue our case-by-case response to requests for humanitarian assistance from recognized NGO's operating in Angola.

Question. When the administration testified before the Select Committee in February of this year, we were told that you were considering an expansion of triangular food arrangements between the United States, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique, for example. Could you let us know what progress you have made in expanding our triangular food trade program in southern Africa?

Answer. Three trilateral agreements were signed with countries in southern Africa in fiscal year 1987. In two cases, countries in the region (Zimbabwe and Kenya) provided white corn for emergency feeding programs in Mozambique in return for U.S. wheat. In return for U.S. wheat, Zimbabwe is also providing white corn to Malawi, most of which is distributed through our emergency feeding program for Mozambican refugees. Other such arrangements may be developed in fiscal year 1988.

Trilateral agreements serve several important purposes. Preferred commodities such as white corn, unavailable directly through Public Law 480, are available for producers in southern Africa. Trading U.S. wheat for this corn helps to develop potential U.S. markets for wheat while simultaneiously developing the framework for future commerce among the countries of southern Africa.

Question. You mentioned in your testimony that there are as many as 300,000 Mozambican refugees living in Malawi and that the U.S. Government has provided $1.4 million to UNHCR and the Red Cross to address this situation. We understand, however, that number could rise to 400,000 refugees by February of next year. Does the U.S. contribution take this projected rise into account, and will we have the funding through our Refugee Bureau to address the exploding refugee problem in the region?

Answer. The refugee situation in Malawi is a fast changing one. The official figure for the number of refugees in that country, as of the end of October, was 357,000. The population is expected to increase to 500,000 by June 1988. In view of these new projections, UNHCR is preparing a special appeal to meet its increasing financial need in Malawi. Through the Bureau for Refugee Programs, we hope to be able to respond to this UNHCR appeal with our traditional level of support.

Southern Africa is the region with the fastest growing refugee population in the world, mostly Mozambicans and Angolans. At the present time, we do not have sufficient leeway under the continuing resolution to respond to any special appeals. If these refugee flows continue at their present pace, it is likely, given the other refugee needs in the Horn and in Central and East Africa, that our requested level of assistance for fiscal year 1988 for Africa ($43.5 million for UNHCR and $14.0 million for ICRC) will not allow us to fund UNHCR and ICRC programs at our expected levels of support. We will monitor the situation closely and work with the rest of the international donor community to mobilize the necessary resources to meet refugee needs in southern Africa and elsewhere.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PEGGY DULANY, PRESIDENT, SYNERGOS INSTITUTE, AND MEMBER, AFRICAN AMERICAN INSTITUTE

My name is Peggy Dulany. I am President of The Synergos Institute in New York and a member of the Board of the African American Institute.

I'm not sure whether it is appropriate to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to address the House Subcommittee on Hunger today, for the preparation of these remarks has forced me to go back over scenes of distress that I had - only slightly - placed to one side since my return from Angola in January of this year.

To give you some sense of the context out of which I speak, since I am not professionally involved with Angola, let me first say how I came to have contact with that country and some of its people, and how I came to go there in November of 1986 and January of 1987.

My father, David Rockefeller, former Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, had visited Angola in 1983. As one of the first Americans to visit after Jose Eduardo dos Santos became President, his visit was remembered positively by the Angolans. Consequently, when I met the Angolan delegation at the African American Institute Conference in Gabon in 1985, I was warmly greeted. The fact that I speak Portuguese also made communication easier.

Later that year, when President dos Santos came to this country, my father and I paid a call on him. Knowing of my interest in international development, and in development in Southern Africa in particular, he at that time extended an invitation for me to visit Angola. It was nearly a year before it was possible for me to go, during which I had occasional contact with Angolan government officials when they were in the United States.

My intention, in telling you about what I saw in Angola is to try to relate the hunger and devastation to the war that is ravaging the country - but in particular, to the kind of war that UNITA is waging against the government of the MPLA. War is, under any circumstances, gruesome and abhorrent. But countries that take that route expect their soldiers to die, their civilians to undergo hardships and the country as a whole to experience some degree of want. That is different, I would argue, from the conscious policy of attacking peasants, raiding villages, destroying crops and planting mines in access roads to agricultural areas.

The hunger you have asked me to describe in Angola is not a result of the mismanagement of the government - which, no doubt, exists - or of the basic fact that the country is at war - for Angola is a rich country that used to produce surpluses of food. It is a function of the way that war is being waged by the so-called Freedom Fighters who claim they want to liberate it from its current government.

To return to my direct observations on the situation in Angola, my November, 1986 visit was so short that I never left Luanda. I had many discussions with people in different branches of the government as well as with a group of visiting American journalists who had had an opportunity to travel extensively in the country. It was possible to get some slight sense of the devastation of the rest of the country from the war by seeing the state of the capitol (scrawny children, legless people, hopeless faces and huge piles of garbage everywhere). But it was clear to me that statistics alone were no way to get a real picture of how things were.

For that reason, I wanted to go back to Angola. The government invited me to return and promised that the next time we would visit areas affected by the war. I hoped that this would give me a better sense of the reality of the effects of the war. It did.

The government representatives organizing our trip had proposed we go to the province of Bie, in the center of the country, to its capitol city of Kuito and the surrounding rural areas. They had set up visits to an orphanage, an orthopedic hospital where recent amputees were recovering from stepping on mines set by UNITA forces; a dislocation camp for people who had to leave their villages because of attacks by UNITA guerrillas; and the Benguela railroad, which could be the lifeline of supplies for both Angola and Zaire, but which is mostly non-functional now because of bridges blown out by Savimbi's forces.

The reality of that orphanage was ugly and sad. Children, well-dressed and well-disciplined, mostly stared at us with vacant, uncomprehending eyes, even while singing songs of welcome to greet us, clapping their hands. Those whom we visited - 98 of them - were all from a few weeks to five years old; the others -600 of them, at this point - had all gone to school. Normally a city of 18,000, Kuito's ranks have swollen in recent years because of families of wounded civilians coming to stay while their relatives recover and then not wanting to return because they feel safer in the city.

The clinic of the orphanage was small and neat, but almost bare of supplies. Nurses proudly showed us two fat folders of handwritten charts for each child: charting their growth, giving the history of their vaccinations and illnesses, fighting the malnutrition with which nearly all the children are initially inflicted. Each week a doctor comes in and reviews the charts with the four nurses that run the place; and when a child is really sick, s/he is sent to the hospital for further treatment.

A tiny refrigerator holds the vaccine, and when the electricity fails, a generator maintains it at constant temperature, courtesy of UNICEF. UNICEF also used to send a milk and grain mixture (from USAID), which was apparently helping the children's nutrition and growth a great deal; but that had not been coming now for several months.

A Cuban doctor was running the orthopedic hospital and took us to several rooms to see the injured. In the first, about ten men lay silently in beds whose sheets were mostly stained with blood. Under the covers one could see flat places where arms and legs should have been.

The doctor described what had happened to them and the deputy governor provided the political context; most of them had been walking to or from work in the fields when a mine exploded under them. Some had been victims of the frequent UNITA hit and run attacks on villages. Perhaps some of the men didn't speak Portuguese, but it must have felt strange to them to be talked about as statistics of a war that to them is so personal.

We moved to the next room, this one full of women, one of whom seemed to be missing both legs and at least one arm; she was just a small lump under the covers, her eyes wide and staring as they followed us around the room.

And then, as if that were not bad enough, we went to the children's room. Again, bloody sheets, stumps of legs and arms. The children were not as self-conscious: they were not covered with a sheet, so the mutilation was more evident. One child, a boy, I think, although I'm not sure, lay on his back with two short pieces of his thighs protruding into the air, one arm bandaged and the other lying limply by his side. even the doctor and deputy governor seemed not to find much to say in the presence of these children.

The dislocated people's camp, run by the Red Cross, was just outside the city, near the airport. On the way, we noticed that the corn was growing almost up against the houses. We were told that people didn't use to plant corn like that. But now it has become too dangerous to go out into the fields to plant because it is on the little footpaths that Savimbi's troops plant their mines. As a result, this fertile country - and one could see that almost anything could grow - is lying largely fallow and there was hunger in this rich province of Bie, which used to be known as the breadbasket of Angola. Nor could food easily be brought from outside, because the railroad is frequently attacked, roads are mined and convoys attacked.

The refugees were singing a song as we arrived, led by several women in the group. One of them, we were told, was walking home from the field one day, her baby slung on her back and her husband walking with her, when she heard shots. As she ran to escape, she felt liquid dripping down her legs; her baby had been shot and died, the bullet stopping there and not reaching her. Her husband too was killed. She had come alone to the camp. She looked as though she too might have rather died.

In the back row a group of people was seated on the ground; why was not immediately evident, until one glimpsed through the crowd that they were missing legs. Those that recover in the hospital are returned to this camp until it is safe for them to return home to their villages.

Over lunch, we were told about the difficulties of life far from the capitol with no regular access to transportation and, therefore, supplies. Smelling wood smoke and inquiring about it, we were told that it was almost impossible to get ordinary provisions. Right then, for instance, there were 3,000 canisters of gas for cooking waiting in a city 600 kilometers away. No truck convoy was willing to risk the likelihood of attack.

This story is brief, non-statistical and, without a doubt, incomplete. I offer, in addition, some observations on the situation in Angola and our government's role in it. These observations are based on readings as well as conversations with many Americans, Angolans and Southern Africans.

They are broader than the subject of hunger because, as I posited at the beginning, that hunger is a direct result of the war and will not end until the war is resolved. So while we should, of course, be concerned with relief measures, the bulk of our energy should be devoted to finding ways to resolve the conflict.

Savimbi may have a true constituency, although it would appear to be tribally based. But he is making no effort to win the hearts, minds or even stomachs of the rest of the country. His war is not being fought around the issue of ideology (although he may say so for the benefit of his American or South African supporters). For what sort of ideology could support the tactics used by UNITA. The attacks are being launched at the direct expense of the Angolan people. Power and control are the issues.

The people of our country and our government have differences with the expressed philosophy of the Angolan government; as we do with that of other communist and socialist regimes. Yet in these other cases, we maintain diplomatic relations with nearly all of those other governments; and in most cases, we do not provide aid to those trying to overthrow them.

It is true that the support Angola receives from the governments of Cuba and the Soviet Union is of concern to us. It should not have been entirely surprising, however, that this occurred, given our longstanding opposition to the MPLA and our refusal to help them as they were getting started.

It is too late to imagine what might have happened had we pursued a different strategy. It is not too late to pay attention to how a different strategy now might affect the current situation. Over the last year, whether out of desperation or a shift in views, the Angolan government has put out many feelers, hoping for an improvement of relations with the United States that could lead up to the establishment of diplomatic relations; they have maintained good business relations with our private sector and have sought ways to improve those ties; they have even asked for help in the management of their business and economy from American and European business people, indicating an openness to making significant changes in their economic system.

In the last two months, the Cubans too have expressed a desire to resolve the conflict and a willingness to negotiate directly, along with the Angolans, the timing and conditions of a Cuban troop withdrawal.

The dilemma, though, is how the Angolans can let the Cubans pull back when Savimbi, strengthened by the military assistance that we and the South Africans are providing him, ravages the countryside and destroys the economy.

Yes, the MPLA has made many mistakes, both political and economic. President dos Santos recently admitted as much. We are justified in our criticisms of the regime for those mistakes. We are not justified in our continued support of a group whose clear strategy is one of destruction of people and land and whose resultant impact is the destruction of the country.

Our government recently refused the Angolan government's request for humanitarian and food aid on the grounds that the MPLA was misallocating its funds to the war instead of taking care of its people. How could they be acting otherwise? Other than by giving up, how could a government at war reduce resources to the fighting of that war, especially when its enemy is receiving from us resources which Savimbi himself has said are playing a decisive role in that war? Whatever our criticism of the MPLA, our war is surely not against the Angolan people. Yet how could they perceive otherwise when we fund a strategy that attacks them directly and then refuse to assist them in their anguish?

We claim to be fighting communism in Southern Africa. But we fail to distinguish between rhetoric and action. And we ignore signals that the Angolan government may be willing to moderate its policies. We ignore the pleas for assistance that could change the attitudes of Angolans about the West, and ultimately shift alliances. And by supporting a group whose tactics are so virulently anti-humanitarian, we are hardly encouraging the development of more positive views of the West and our policies.

Hunger is the presenting issue in Angola; it is the focus and concern of this Subcommittee. But let us be clear about what is causing that hunger and what must be done to end it. It is the war, but in particular, the war strategy of Savimbi's UNITA, the group our government has chosen to support.

We must not, and need not be the only ones to change our policy. The South Africans, the Cubans and the Angolans must all come to the table willing to make concessions. Now appears to be the time when at least the latter two are willing to do so.

So I urge you on this Committee to see the issue on which you are focusing today - the issue of hunger - in its larger context: to use your influence with others in our government to change its policy and to bring to bear pressure on the South African government to make changes in response to agreed upon concessions from the other side. This must happen if the war and hunger in Angola are to end.

Prepared Statement of Charles Evers, Mayor, Fayette, MS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, let me start my remarks by thanking you for providing me this opportunity to present you with my views on hunger in a vital part of southern Africa. Recently, I returned from a fact-finding mission to the democratic areas of Angola, which are controlled by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, or UNITA. While there, I spoke with numerous religious leaders, political spokesmen, and military personnel. I also had a chance to speak privately with Dr. Jonas Savimbi, the founder of UNITA. I would now like to share with you some of the findings from my trip, concerning hunger in Angola.

It is clear the twelve-year civil war between UNITA and the ruling Communist regime has devastated Angola's agricultural industries. Before the civil war Angola exported food. Now she imports more than half her requirements. To make up for the food deficit, Angolan government officials have issued an international appeal for aid. But this cannot be a lasting solution to a problem gripping 15 percent of Angola's population. The lasting solution is to end the war. When the war ends, so will hunger problems as food production is restored. We know, therefore, what must be done to end the famine threat; the Communists must be persuaded to agree to a cease fire with UNITA. For years, UNITA has sought a cease fire followed by free and fair elections, but the regime refuses to set aside its weapons or honor election promises it made. And so Angolans may starve.

All the evidence demonstrates that famine victims, if aid is not sent, will live in Communist-controlled areas. I can tell you first-hand there is no hunger in areas controlled by UNITA. Everyone I saw in Free Angola was well-fed. In liberated Angola, I saw farmland whose output Middle America would envy. It is testimony to UNITA's morale that even in the midst of death and destruction, its food production is sufficient to feed all of its people.

This is the untold surprising hunger story of Angola. UNITA personnel are not suffering from malnutrition, despite repeated assaults by government and Cuban troops armed with lethal Soviet hardware. I marvel at UNITA's ability to absorb minimal assistance from the U.S., African allies, and Middle Eastern friends, and successfully defend themselves against the combined might of the Soviet Union, Cuba, other Eastern bloc forces, and the Angolan regime. To succeed against these odds is amazing. To have no civilian hunger problem is miraculous.

But hunger may yet confront UNITA. I understand that a key objective of the regime is to destroy UNITA's bread basket, thereby threatening civilians in UNITA's territory with famine. Recent reports indicate that the regime has not succeeded in taking these areas by force. And so, UNITA's civilians will eat.

The decision by the Marxist regime to continue the war is not the only reason why their city dwellers may starve. Another reason is the regime's decision to devote an increasing share of its resources to killing UNITA supporters instead of feeding its own civilian population. Recovering oil prices increased the regime's revenues by $500 million this year, a 33 percent increase, while they have appealed for $116 million in emergency aid. Even less may be required since grain prices have fallen. If the regime cared more about feeding its people than buying Soviet tanks and MiG's, hunger in Angola would not be an issue.

U.S. food policy to date has been appropriate. Although its own government seems to care little, America cannot permit innocent Angolans to starve. And we have not done so. According to U.S. government estimates, our country has provided more than 12,000 metric tons of food to Angola this past fiscal year. We provide a major portion of all international food assistance to Angola through UNICEF. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, which has a 10-year economic cooperation agreement with the Luanda regime, prefers to export arms, rather than food. While the United States sent millions of dollars to feed Angolans last year, the Soviet Union sent millions of ruples in weapons to kill them.

In closing, I urge the Committee to recommend continued food assistance to Communist Angola, but I also urge you to recommend sending humanitarian assistance of other kinds to democratic areas controlled by UNITA. In any event care should be taken to see that threatened civilians receive food aid, not the regime's soldiers.

Angola's black population deserves its human rights just as blacks do in South Africa. The Soviets and Cubans have made it clear they are determined to snuff out freedom in Angola, and they are willing to starve Angolans to do it. We cannot allow them to succeed any more than we can allow apartheid to continue. And so, while we confront racist South Africa in the name of human rights, to be consistent, we must also send humanitarian and military aid to preserve the democratic option in Angola.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAURICE F. STRONG

Hunger continues to stalk Southern Africa. Recurrent droughts have contributed to it. But the principal causes are man-made and, more explicitly, made in South Africa. For South Africa's policies of destabilizing the economies of its neighbors, incitement of and support for internal insurgency and direct attacks on their territory are the prime source of the long agony that continues to afflict Southern Africa. They are the ugly byproducts of the South African government's stubborn commitment to apartheid which denies the majority of its own people the most basic of human rights and imposes its will by the most systematically repressive regime of state terrorism that the world has seen since the fall of Nazi Germany.

In the few minutes which you have been good enough to accord me today, I would like to concentrate my remarks on one of the countries that is suffering most acutely as a result of this-Mozambique. I have just returned from there and my observations reflect what I learned as a result of my visit.

You do not need to be reminded of the grim statistics that illustrate the grim state of Mozambique's economy and the appalling suffering that afflicts such a large percentage of its people. The immediate needs for relief supplies are largely in hand or in sight, except for some of the non-food aid items which are always hardest to come by. But insecurity in the rural areas makes it impossible to deliver these supplies to many of the people who need them most. And the same insecurity is frustrating government efforts to rehabilitate its economy and revitalize the processes of economic development which is the only permanent solution to the country's problems.

The government is strongly committed to its Economic Rehabilitation Program which all agree comprises a sound mix of policies and market oriented incentives. But their implementation will not be easy and they will need larger and longer term commitments of external assistance from the countries that have been so generous in responding to their emergency relief needs. Mozambicans are certainly grateful for the relief; but they are concerned about the tendency to institutionalize emergency measures like food aid.

The leadership of Mozambique is dedicated, pragmatic and able. In discussions with them there is a notable absence of ideological rhetoric and a strong desire for closer cooperation with western countries, particularly the United States. This is evidenced in their openness to and very good relations with the many private voluntary agencies now playing such an important role in helping them to meet their emergency and rehabilitation needs as well as in their manifest interest in attracting foreign private investment and knowhow.

The biggest obstacle to the implementation of the Economic Rehabilitation Program is the same as that which prevents emergency relief from flowing to so many of those who need it, the pervasive insecurity which holds so much of the country in its grip. This is not the product of any general uprising, although the government itself admits that the people of the rural areas have much reason to be dissatisfied. Rather, it is due to a series of terrorist-type attacks on important economic targets, like the transportation corridors, and the civilian population by relatively small groups of "bandits" operating under the general rubric of RENAMO.

While some of these attacks may in fact be the product of localized banditry, the fact that they are directed at so many strategic economic targets points to a broad sense of strategy which most believe is South African inspired and supported. Their brutal and wanton attacks on civilians, including women, children and those that are already sick and helpless, alienate the people whose support they would surely be seeking if their purpose was to offer a political alternative to the present government.

What they are accomplishing is to keep the rural areas in a constant state of terror, uncertainty and instability which is far more in keeping with South Africa's policy objectives than the kind of objectives that a legitimate internal political movement would be expected to have. In fact I found, no one in the international community in Maputo who considered that RENAMO was a real indigenous political movement and a plausible alternative to the present government.

I also found a very high, indeed virtually unanimous, degree of concurrence in the international community there with the assertion by the government of Mozambique that what it needs most urgently is assistance to provide a much greater measure of security against attacks on strategic economic infrastructures and the civilian population on the part of the RENAMO bandits. Of course direct military assistance would be the best way of meeting this need. So far the only western country that has been willing to provide such assistance is the United Kingdom which is providing a modest but very much appreciated training program for Mozambican officers.

But non-lethal assistance - such basic items as food, clothing, boots and medical supplies as well as transport, communications and logistical supplies, including vehicles and helicopters, will go a long way to meeting these security needs. And this would represent the most cost effective investment on the part of those who really want to help Mozambique. It would also have the most immediate and decisive impact in terms of relief of human suffering and effective implementation of the Economic Rehabilitation Program. Dealing with the consequences of the security problem is simply not good enough; if we are really seriously interested in helping Mozambique, we must also help them deal with its causes.

For there is another hunger in Southern Africa. It is a hunger for peace, for security and stability so that people can rebuild their shattered lives and join in the rehabilitation and development of their societies. In stressing the urgency of their need for security assistance, Mozambican officials also made clear that the only long-term solution to their problems, and those of Southern Africa, lies in a resolution of the basic political conflict with South Africa. They make the point that South Africa's policies of destabilizing and terrorizing its neighbors cannot be in its own interests and that despite their immutable opposition to South Africa's apartheid policies, they would welcome the opportunity of cooperating with a multi-racial South Africa in ushering in a new and positive era of peace, security and prosperity for all of Southern Africa.

Personally, I think the positive image of the exciting, dynamic place which Southern Africa could be if South Africa could make the transition to a genuinely multi-racial society is too often lost in the bitterness and polarization to which apartheid has given rise, both within South Africa and outside it. The Mozambicans impressed me as being very much aware of this and willing to work hard to achieve it. They know the South Africans better than most; their economy is more closely linked with and dependent on that of South Africa. With the help and support of the West, I believe they can play a leading role in the processes of accommodation and reconciliation which, in the final analysis, offer the only prospect of bringing the long agony of Southern Africa to an end and enabling the people of that region to achieve the more positive and hopeful future which that beautiful and bountiful region could offer to all its inhabitants.

As one who has had a longstanding involvement in the United Nations, I would like to add a word on the role of the U.N. in respect of Southern Africa. The United Nations has done, and is doing, a great deal to help the nations of Southern Africa - by providing humanitarian assistance, by supporting their continuing drive for economic and social development, and by providing the principal forum for dealing with the fundamental political issues which underlie the conflicts and divisions which afflict that region. But it can and should do even more. The U.N. has put in place at the headquarters level in New York, arrangements designed to provide coordination and impetus to its efforts to support the countries of Southern Africa. I believe its contribution to meeting the emergencies of the front-line African states would be immensely strengthened by establishing counterpart arrangements in the region itself designed to provide much greater coordination, focus and leadership in the mobilization and employment of resources in close cooperation with SADCC to broaden and increase the U.N.'s support for the member states of SADCC. This, I believe, could best be done by appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary General of the U.N. for Southern Africa with responsibilities, on a regional basis, similar to those which the Special Representative of the Secretary General had in Ethiopia and in Sudan during the recent famine emergency in those countries.